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These essays are motivated by political economy problems in developing countries. The
first chapter studies whether programmatic policies are irrelevant for politicians’ electoral
fortunes. I show that the answer is no with a political agency model where politicians’
competence is uncertain to all. In my setup, an incumbent can allocate a budget to public
goods and transfers, which differ in one key dimension: the former fluctuates more over
time than the latter. When the incumbent increases the budget to public goods, two
effects arise: his performance in office today reveals more information about his identity
(an informativeness effect), and voters’ anticipation of narrow transfers tomorrow increases
the salience of political selection (a stakes effect). To the incumbent, these two effects
move in opposing directions and, consequently, the strategic allocation of the budget
helps him to advance his electoral fortunes. The second chapter studies a model where
an economic elite wants to buy a public asset as cheaply as possible, whose ownership is
decided by an incumbent politician. The elite can make a buying offer for the asset and
manipulate the information that is available to voters about the incumbent’s competence.
By attacking the incumbent (trying to uncover bad news about his competence before
making an offer) or threatening him (with uncovering bad), I show that the elite can reduce
the prices that the incumbent would accept for selling the asset. I also show that the elite
often uses threats against a leading incumbent and attacks against a trailing one. Finally,
the third chapter (joint with Alberto Parmigiani) studies a model where an influential
citizen can try to get away with tax evasion by investing in the complexity of his evasion
scheme —which we call “brains”, and by committing to delivering punishment against
those that investigate him —which we call ”muscles”. By characterizing the citizen’s
optimal strategies, the model yields a testable prediction: estimates of international tax
evasion display an inverted U-shape along the quality of institutions. We provide evidence
of this finding by building a panel dataset of estimated offshore wealth by individuals for
37 countries between 2002 to 2016.
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Privatization under Elites’ Manipulation of Information
Abstract
An economic elite wants to buy a public asset as cheaply as possible. Its ownership
is decided by an incumbent politician who can be of high or low competence. The elite
can make a buying offer for the asset and manipulate the information that is available to
voters about the incumbent’s competence. By attacking the incumbent (trying to uncover
bad news about his competence before making him an offer) or threatening him (with
uncovering bad news if he refuses to sell), I show that the elite can reduce the prices that
the incumbent would accept for selling the asset. I also show that the elite often (but not
always) uses threats against a leading incumbent (one who has better reputation than his
challenger) and attacks against a trailing one. I further find that a better reputation can
actually render an incumbent more susceptible to the elite’s influence.
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1.1 Introduction
Paraphrasing Mayhew’s (1974) famous standpoint, reelection is any politician’s north
star. As such, politicians dread the revelation of electorally damaging information. This
means that whoever can manipulate the information available to voters should yield great
influence over representatives and, thereby, over the policies that they choose to take.
And there are many reasons to believe that economic elites are at a decisive advantage in
this domain. From the control of media outlets in developing and developed countries
to the use of issue advocacy in the United States, elites everywhere have the ability to
potentially hurt office-holders by trying to harm their reputation. But how much influence
does this channel offer to elites? What type of strategy do they use?
To provide some answers to these important questions, I develop a model of the
privatization of a public asset under the shadow of information manipulation by an
economic elite.1 My model has three key ingredients. First, an incumbent politician,
who can be of high or low competence, can choose whether to sell a public asset and
at what price to sell it. Second, voters can learn about the incumbent’s competence by
observing his performance in office. The amount of voter learning depends on the budget
that he handles: the bigger the budget, the more can voters learn (see Ashworth, Bueno
de Mesquita and Friedenberg, 2017). And, finally, there is an economic elite that wants to
buy the public asset as cheaply as possible. To do so, the elite can commit to a strategy
to manipulate voters’ beliefs about the incumbent’s competence: they can attack him (try
to uncover bad news about his competence before making him a buying offer) or they can
1As I will argue later, the model is also applicable to other policy domains
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threaten him (try to uncover bad news if he refuses to take their offer).
I show that, in order to achieve their goal of buying the asset cheaply, the elite often
(but not always) uses threats against an electorally leading incumbent (one who, in the
absence of additional information, has a better reputation than his challenger) and employs
attacks against a trailing one. As I explain below, the elite’s strategies emerge from the
incumbent’s electoral evaluation of the arrival of new information about his ability.
We can begin by considering first-order political distortions — an incumbent’s incentives
to sell the public asset in the absence of elites’ capacity to manipulate information. Suppose
that the elite is dealing with a trailing incumbent. If voters do not learn new information
about his type, then by the time of the election he would remain as the worse candidate
to appoint. To improve his chances of being reelected, he needs to prove himself to be
better than this contender. In other words, he seeks the revelation of information about
his true competence. Bad news about his type does not affect him much (he is already
electorally behind), but good news could give him an edge to reduce his trail and perhaps
even turn him into the leading candidate.
What would be the stance of this incumbent if presented with some offer to privatize
the public asset? Precisely because of the informational consequences of privatization (an
increase in the amount of voter learning as he would handle a bigger budget), he would
be willing to sell as it would expand his possibilities of proving himself to be better than
his contender. That is, a trailing incumbent’s demand for information revelation creates
incentives for him to over-sell the asset. The deeper his trail, the higher his incentives to
over-sell it.
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Suppose now that the elite faces a leading incumbent. Given that he is electorally
ahead of his challenger, he has little to prove —voters believe that he is the best candidate
in the electoral race. The arrival of good news could give him a further edge, but bad
news could compromise his electoral chances. What would be his stance if a privatization
offer was on the table? He may be unwilling to sell the asset, because it would increase
the risk of losing his electoral status if he performs poorly despite having handled a bigger
budget. That is, we can think that a leading incumbent is information-averse and, as a
result, he has an incentive to under-sell the asset. The narrower his electoral lead, the
higher his incentives to under-sell because the more damaging a potential arrival of bad
news would be.
Let us now consider the second-order political distortions that emerge when we allow the
elite to manipulate the information available to voters about the incumbent’s competence.
In my framework, the elite’s commitment to an information manipulation strategy takes
two forms. First, they can commit to a signal structure (which we can think of as an
investigation) to persuade voters that the incumbent is incompetent; that is, the elite
engages in Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). For example, they
can devise a project of investigative journalism that would collect information about an
office-holder’s failures and achievements, which would suggest what type of politician
the incumbent is more likely to be. Second, the elite can commit to a timing: use this
investigation to attack the incumbent or to threaten him. An information manipulation
strategy then consists of an investigation and how to make use of it.
With these preliminaries, suppose again that the elite faces a trailing incumbent. To
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them, this incumbent’s need for information implies that there is always a price that he
would accept for the asset. The elite’s problem is not to compel him into selling, but to
have him sell at cheap prices. How can the elite accomplish this goal?
On the one hand, the elite could use threats. Yet they anticipate that a trailing
incumbent needs information and this renders him immune to this strategy. Even further,
threats could be entirely counterproductive: the incumbent might have incentives to reject
the offer, since by refusing it the incumbent would guarantee that voters would learn both
from his performance in office and from the investigation —which would be triggered as a
consequence.
On the other hand, the elite could attack him. They know that the higher the
incumbent’s electoral disadvantage, the higher his need for information. By attacking
him, the elite can then gamble on the investigation yielding bad news and further tainting
his reputation: this would reduce the prices that this incumbent would accept, as a
consequence of his even greater need for information. In effect, the elite knows that
attacks are risky: just like bad news could reduce the price that he would accept, good
news may increase it. But since the incumbent is trailing (i.e. he has relatively low
reputation), the likelihood of good news is low and, thus, there is little risk of an attack
backfiring. Nevertheless, I show that as a safeguard for the backfiring risk, the elite’s
optimal investigation would keep this incumbent in his trailing status even if good news
ensue —because they value his need for information revelation. Consequently, the elite
attacks him in the hope of obtaining a lower price for the public asset.
Consider now a leading incumbent. To the elite, this incumbent’s information aversion
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implies that he may refuse to take an offer for the asset. But then, it is precisely his
aversion towards information revelation that makes him vulnerable to the elite’s capacity
to manipulate voters’ beliefs about his type. I show that the elite’s optimal investigation
involves materializing a leading incumbent’s worst fear after bad news: take away his
electoral advantage and turn him into trailing. I also show that, in general, the elite
prefers threats to attacks. This is because attacks can always backfire if the investigation
produces good news, which would improve his reputation and, as a result, further reduce
his unwillingness to sell.
The logic above indicates that an incumbent with a very small electoral advantage
over his challenger is the most susceptible to this form of influence. The mere threat
of the elite’s optimal investigation induces such just-leading incumbent to sell the asset
at the lowest possible price —and at a huge cost to the welfare of voters. On the other
hand, as the incumbent’s reputation for competence increases, the effectiveness of threats
start to decrease because the less likely it is that the elite’s investigation results in bad
news about his type. I show that this effectiveness of threats can attenuate to the point
where the elite would rather attack him instead. In so doing, the elite gambles on the
investigation yielding in bad news: this would turn him into the trailing candidate, whose
need for information revelation would make him willing to sell the asset for a relatively
cheaper price.
Finally, the findings of this paper also have a key empirical implication for scholars
concerned with measuring the influence that special interests exert on the policy-making
process. While there is a vast theoretical literature that studies the effects of threats on
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political decisions (see Dal Bó and Di Tella, 2003; Wolton, 2020), this specific strategy
imposes a hard bound on what empirical scholars can do: threats are never materialized
in equilibrium. Although threats are also present in this paper, these are restricted for
incumbents with a narrow electoral lead. For all other cases, the elite’s form of influence
involves attacks, which is potentially measurable as it can be observed —for instance,
by examining a newspaper’s scrutiny of an incumbent politician. That is, this paper’s
prediction of the effects that attacks may have on equilibrium privatization prices is
something that calls to be brought to the data.
1.2 Related literature
This paper builds on the career-concerns and symmetric-uncertainty literature for studying
political agency problems between an incumbent politician, who can be of varying ability,
and a voter that is concerned with selecting competent office-holders. Among this
literature, my model is closest to Ashworth, Bueno de Mesquita, and Friedenberg (2017),
who investigate a model in which a politician’s type and effort (in my case, a budget)
interact in the production function of his performance in office, which triggers incentives
to select an effort level so as to manipulate the probability distribution over observable
statistics. I follow this insight but apply to a different setting, with the incumbent’s
problem being the price at which he would accept to sell an asset, taking into account the
implications that an increase in the budget will have in his reelection chances due to an
increase in the amount of voter learning about his competence.
It also builds on the literature that studies the distortions that lobbying can cause in
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the policy-making process. A vast amount of scholars have studied the influence of special
interest groups through strategies such as campaign contributions or the transmission
of policy-relevant information (see Austen-Smith 1996; Grossman and Helpman 2001;
Lohmann 1995). This paper, in contrast, belongs to a part of the literature that focuses
on outside lobbying, which some authors define as the “attempts by interest group leaders
to mobilize citizens outside the policymaking community to contact or pressure public
officials inside the policymaking community” (Kollman 1998, 3). Within this literature,
outside lobbying has been modeled and understood in several ways, such as the provision
of information in order to change the salience of issues (Kollman 1998; Yu 2005); trying
to change voters’ preferences over policies by affecting the information that media collects
and provides to voters (Sobbrio 2011); or reduce the probability of bills being enacted
by investing in political advertising (Wolton 2020). In contrast, this paper models and
understands outside lobbying as a strategy to manipulate voters’ beliefs about a politician’s
time-invariant characteristics (such as competence) in order to alter the political decisions
that are taken.
My model is also close to Dal Bó and Di Tella (2003), and Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Di
Tella (2006). In the former, the authors investigate a model where a reelection concerned
and unbribable policy-maker has to choose between a good and a bad policy, and where a
pressure group chooses a level of punishment if he chooses the good policy —which can,
for instance, include legal harassment. They show both that threats can be a cause of
distortions even when bribes are absent, and that threats can delay the adoption of good
policies if the electoral rewards from holding office is not high enough. And in Dal Bó, Dal
Bó and Di Tella (2006), the authors examine the interaction between bribery and threats,
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in a model where politicians could be bribable, the entry of policy-makers into the public
sphere is endogenous but where office-holders do not have electoral motives. They show
that threats can increase the effectiveness of bribes: when they are used, it reduces the
size of bribes needed to push the public official into transferring to them the resources;
hence, in a world with threats, pressure groups are more likely to become active.
There are three main differences with the before-mentioned models. First, a focus on
threats may overlook a non-trivial amount of influence when special interests strategically
prefer to engage in attacks. In my framework, I therefore allow attacks and threats as
strategies to be endogenously chosen. Second, the threat of punishment is not explicitly
modelled in the previous papers but parametrized (that is, it is left black-boxed). As such,
the parameter can be given different interpretations, such as legal harassment or media
attacks. I extend the literature by studying influence as a persuasion attempt, which can
be used both as threats and attacks and where its success depends on the incumbent’s
underlying ability. Finally, in both papers the incentives for a special interest to engage
in threats is to exert pressure over an office-holder’s decision to take or not take an action
—that is, an “extensive margin”, such as a yes/no decision. In my model, it is rather the
level of an action (the prices that an incumbent would accept for the sale of a public
asset, i.e. an “intensive margin”) which creates incentives for a special interest to exert
influence.
Finally, I also build on the literature that employs Bayesian persuasion as a technology
to manipulate voters’ beliefs about the incumbent’s ability (Kamenica and Gentzkow
2011; Alonso and Câmara 2016). The main technical innovation is that I allow a Bayesian
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persuasion strategy to be used by the elite as a threat in order to maximise their expected
payoff. Additionally, this paper shows that the signal structure by the economic elite is
different when the incumbent is trailing or leading, which highlights the importance to
account for the ex-ante electoral fortunes of a player when designing a persuasion strategy.
1.3 The Model
I study a two-period (t ∈ {1, 2}) game between a representative voter (V); two politicians
(J), an incumbent (I) and a challenger (C); and an economic elite (E).2 The elite wants to
buy a public asset, whose control is within the authority of the incumbent. In the first
period, the elite can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the incumbent to purchase the
asset. The incumbent’s decision affects the budget available for the provision of public
services in both periods.
Politicians can be of “high” or “low” ability (I use ability and competence interchange-
ably). The set of types is Θ = {0, 1}, standing respectively for low and high types. A
politician’s type θJ ∈ Θ is fixed but known to all players (symmetric uncertainty), who
commonly share a prior Pr(θJ = 1) = πJ ∈ (0, 1).
The provision of public services (gt) depends on a production technology and a random
shock. The production technology indicates how public goods are created from money: it
maps the per-period budget available for public services (bt ∈ R+) and the type of the
office-holder into an outcome. In period t ∈ {1, 2}, the governance outcome is the given
2I reserve the pronouns “she” for the voter, “he” for politicians, and “they” for the elite.
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by
gt = bt (1 + θI) + ηt (1)
where ηt is the random shock, which I assume to be independently drawn from a
uniform distribution on [−1,+1] —this is the minimum support to guarantee that resources
are never enough to reveal with probability one the incumbent’s type, which simplifies
the exposition.
The budget for public goods provision depends on the revenues that the public asset
generates. This asset is valuable because it produces a per-period unit of money —which
implies that the total profitability of the asset across the two periods is equal to two units.
The economic elite wants to buy the asset and can offer to the incumbent a price λ ≥ λ
for it, with λ > 1 being an institutional reservation price.3 The price that the elite offers
is endogenous. If presented with an offer to buy, the incumbent determines whether to
take it (and privatize it) or refuse it (and keep the asset under public ownership). As
Table 1.1 shows, his decision has an impact on the budget for public goods provision both
today and tomorrow.
Table 1.1: Budget for public goods provision
Ownership t = 1 t = 2
Public 1 1
Private λ 0
3We can think about the institutional reservation price as the price below which investigations are
triggered, imposing the risk of an indictment to the incumbent and an annulment of the sale. The higher
the institutional reservation price is, the stronger the institutions to protect the interests of the population
(see Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Di Tella 2003).
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Naturally, the elite would like to the incumbent to sell them the asset at a cheap price.
To distort the price that he would accept (which I call the “intensive margin”), they can
commit to an information manipulation strategy aimed at using their media power to
negatively affecting the voter’s evaluation of his competence. This commitment takes two
forms.
First, they can commit to a timing: before the incumbent makes his privatization
decision —which I call an “attack”, or conditional on his decision —which I call a “threat”.
Second, they can commit to a signal structure to manipulate the voter’s beliefs about
the incumbent’s competence; that is, they engage in Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and
Gentzkow 2011).
This investigation can be be intuitively understood as the non-strategic disclosure of
the results of an investigative journalism enterprise, such as “a survey [or] some regression
analysis” (Austen-Smith 1998, 283), which is endogenously bounded by the fact that the
higher the likelihood that the design of the investigation end up supporting the elite’s
interest (a signal that the incumbent is incompetent), the less informative it is about his
true underlying incumbent’s ability.
Formally, an investigation Ω consists of a finite realization space s ∈ S = {0, 1},
and a family of likelihood functions over S, {Ω(·|θI)}θI∈Θ, with Ω(.|θI) ∈ ∆(S). Given
an investigation Ω and a prior πI , each signal realization s leads to a posterior belief
Pr(θI = 1|s) = µs ∈ ∆(Θ). Hence, given a prior πI , an investigation Ω leads to a
distribution of posteriors τ = 〈Ω|πI〉 ∈ ∆(∆(Θ)). The result of such investigation is a
signal realization observed by all players.
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An information manipulation strategy consists of an investigation and how to use
it, which I define as a tuple (Ω, a), with a ∈ {0, 1} stands for using the investigation to
“attack” (a = 1) or to “threaten” (a = 0) the incumbent. I also allow the elite to do
nothing, which for ease of exposition I leave without explicit notation.
Politicians are both office and legacy motivated. The utility function of politician
J ∈ {I, C} in period t ∈ {1, 2} is
uJ =

w + (1− w) gt if in office
0 otherwise
where w ∈ (0, 1) measures the weights he attaches to office rents relative to his legacy.




2− λ if the asset is bought
0 otherwise
Finally, the voter only cares about the level of public services. Her utility function in
period t ∈ {1, 2} is simply equal to the level of services provided (that is, uV = gt).
The game proceeds as follows:
• Period 1:
0. Nature draws the politicians’ types and the random shocks;
1. The elite designs an information manipulation strategy. If the strategy includes
21
an attack, then an investigation is conducted and players observe its signal
realization;
2. The elite makes an offer to the incumbent to buy the public asset. If he refuses
to sell and the information manipulation strategy included a threat, then an
investigation is conducted and players observe its signal realization;
3. The incumbent uses the available budget to provide public services;
4. The voter decides whether to retain the incumbent.
• Period 2:
1. The office-holder uses the available budget to provide public services;
2. Payoffs are realized and the game ends.
The structure of the game is common knowledge. The per-period budget for public
services is observed by all players. The solution concept employed is Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium. In a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, (i) the voter optimally decides whether to
reelect the incumbent, given her beliefs about the politicians’ types; (ii) players’ beliefs are
derived by Bayes’ rule on the equilibrium path; and (iii) the incumbent and the pressure
group act optimally given the voter’s reelection strategy.
The use of a Bayesian persuasion technology requires to impose two conditions for an
equilibrium: (i) when the incumbent is indifferent between privatizing and not privatizing,
he chooses to privatize; and, (ii) when the expected competence of the candidates is the
same, she votes for the challenger.4 If any of these conditions does not hold, then it would
4This is adopted to simplify the analysis. The equilibrium condition only requires for the voter not to
vote for the challenger with probability one.
22
not be possible to ensure the existence of an optimal signal structure (an investigation)
that maximises the elite’s expected utility.5
I also adopt two indifference-breaking rules. First, when the elite is indifferent between
making an offer for the asset or not, they do not make an offer. Although this rule is
without loss of generality, it allows more clarity of exposition on the possible distortions
generated by the elite —as it is equivalent to saying that the elite would never buy the
asset at its market price, that is, at the price at which it would be sold in a perfectly
competitive market (λ = 2).
Second, notice that if the asset is privatized, then the candidates’ competence no longer
matters. Indeed, this is an artefact which allows me to focus entirely on the revenues that
the public asset generates. Adopting this artefact implies that we then need to define an
electoral rule if privatization occurs. I assume that the voter elects the challenger when
she believes him to be of strictly higher competence than the incumbent; and she elects
the incumbent otherwise. Notice further that this indifference-breaking rule would be
optimal if I would incorporate an epsilon amount of budget tomorrow coming from any
other source of revenues, such as from taxation.
Finally, the following definition will be useful for the analysis:
Definition: Leading and trailing incumbent. An incumbent is leading if the prior
belief that he is competent is higher than the prior on the challenger (πI > πC); otherwise
(πI ≤ πC), he is trailing.
5Formally, these two conditions guarantee the upper semicontinuity of the elite’s expected utility
along the prior belief that the incumbent is competent, which in turn “ensures the existence of an optimal
signal” (Kamenica and Gentzknow, 2011; p. 2596).
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1.3.1 Comments on the model
There are five points worth stressing. The first point is the decision to lay out the model
in a privatization setting. This particular approach comes with several advantages. One
convenience is that privatization is an example of a political choice that can directly affect
voters’ welfare because of its impact on the public budgets for the provision of public
goods and services. Precisely due to this effect, privatization has long been a concern
of citizens not only in weak democracies (for Latin America, see Stahl 1994) but also in
strong ones (for the United States, see Montagnes and Bektemirov 2018). That is, I focus
on a relevant policy problem.
Additionally, this setting allows me to have precise benchmark: in my model, citizens
suffer each time the asset is sold below its market price —as I abstract away from aspects
such as the efficiency in its management. Put equivalently, by focusing on an office-holder’s
decision to privatize, I study the type of influence that the public is afraid of —one in
which electoral incentives, instead of being a mechanism to discipline politicians, can be
the very cause of policy distortions.
The second point concerns any evidence of the edge that economic elites may have on
manipulating the information that is available to voters and, perhaps more importantly,
any anecdotal evidence that an advantage in this domain would have possibly yielded them
a benefit in a privatization process. Regarding the former, a proxy for the advantage that
economic elites may have at manipulating information is the documented concentration
in media ownership. Empirically, not only media concentration is a rather pervasive
phenomenon across countries with different levels of development, but its owners often
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have financial stakes outside the media sector. In Peru, the Miró Quesada family (with
financial stakes in the real estate and construction sectors) owns El Comercio, the
newspaper with the most circulation of the country. In Mexico, Salinas Group (banking
and insurance) owns TV Azteca, the second largest media conglomerate. In France,
Dassault Group (real estate and aviation) owns Le Figaro, one of the newspapers with
the largest readership. In the United States, the Murdoch family (with vast stakes in
the entertainment industry) owns The Wall Street Journal, The New York Post and Fox
News.
And with regards to the latter, the undue influence that the before-mentioned position
of advantage could offer to economic elites has been pointed out in different privatization
processes. For example, under the administration of president Carlos Menem in Argentina,
the member of Congress Alberto Natale denounced irregularities in the privatization of
public TV channels. Natale argued that “there was a strong suspicion that the terms of
sale for channels 11 and 13 had been designed to favour the local groups Macri and Clarin
respectively” (Natale 1993, 102; as cited by Manzetti 1999). This was also the editorial
position of the media outlet Ambito Financiero, which considered the sale of channel 13
as “appalling” since, in their view, it was “a direct adjudication [that eliminated] three
bidders to leave only Clarin” (Ambito Financiero, December 26, 1989; as cited by Sivak
2015, 143-144). At the time of this adjudication and until today, Clarin Group owns
Diario Clarin, the most circulated newspaper of the country. Illicit monetary transactions
(such as bribery) were never proven. It is in the view of this paper that, were these alleged
irregularities true, the capacity of Clarin Group to manipulate the information available
to voters through Diario Clarin may not have been an irrelevant factor in the decision to
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sell channel 13 to them. Specially if we consider, as some scholars suggest, that president
Menem “was very sensitive to public opinion trends” given the “hyperinflation outbursts
of 1989 and 1990” (Manzetti 1999, 87).
The third point regards the assumption that the elite can commit to triggering threats
if the incumbent refuses to sell. This is a common assumption in the lobbying literature,
such as with campaign contributions (Grossman and Helpman 2001) or with threats (Dal
Bo and Di Tella 2003). Perhaps the most straightforward way to make justify it is to think
of a richer model where there are repeated interactions between elite and office-holders. If
this is the case, then the elite would not want to build a reputation of engaging on empty
threats.
The fourth point is related to the way in which a threat would operate in real life.
Although this could happen in explicit language (e.g. “If you do not sell me the public
asset, then I will attempt to harm your reputation”), it can also be implicit: in equilibrium,
the incumbent would infer the conditions in which the elite’s offer carries a threat if he
refuses to sell —as well as the optimal investigation that the elite would use to try to
affect his electoral fortunes.
Finally, the fifth point involves the suitability of the persuasion technology. In the
general Sender-Receiver model, Bayesian persuasion gives a high commitment power to
Sender. This can make it difficult to think about contexts where this assumption is likely
to hold, because lying is often costless. In effect, Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) motivate
this technology in a court of law, where a prosecutor (Sender) would incur in the crime of
perjury if he lies to the judge (Receiver). Mutatis mutandis, a similar rationale applies to
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this model: in the strongest case, the economic elite may order their team of journalists
how to address an issue, but the deontological codes of the journalistic profession imposes
some constraints in that the elite cannot coerce them into lying or manufacturing evidence.
1.4 Analysis
This section starts by laying out the equilibrium behaviour when the economic elite
can only make take-it-or-leave-it offers to purchase the asset. This will be the baseline.
Given the privatization prices at baseline, I then examine the elite’s incentives to push
these prices down down by engaging in information manipulation about the incumbent’s
competence.
1.4.1 First-order distortions: No information manipulation
Working through backwards induction, in the second period the office-holder has no
strategic options: he provides public services with whatever budget he has available. Thus,
all the strategic tensions concentrate in the first period.
By the end of the first period and after observing the incumbent’s performance in
office, voters think about tomorrow with updated beliefs about his type —which I denote
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⇔ µI > πC (2)
Anticipating that the voter will only vote for him if she believes him to be more
likely to be competent than his challenger, the incumbent internalises that his first-period
performance will be crucial for his re-election chances. How much can the voter learn
about the incumbent’s competence upon observing the provision of public services?

















g1 < 2 b1 − 1
)
Note. All points within the dashed black (blue) lines are outcomes that can be produced by a competent
(incompetent) politician.
As in Izzo (2018), the learning process is stark: players learn everything or nothing
about him. To understand how full learning is induced, notice that a low ability incumbent
has an upper-bound on how well he can perform, which is given by any budget that he
handles and the highest positive value that the random shock can take (that is, 1+b1). Any
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provision of public services above that level will reveal with certainty that the incumbent
is competent. This is represented in the left panel of Figure 1.1.
Similarly, a high ability incumbent has a lower-bound on how badly he can perform,
which is given by any budget that he handles and the lowest negative value that the
random shock can take (that is, 2 b1 − 1). As it is represented in the right panel of Figure
1.1, any provision of public services below that level will reveal with certainty that the
incumbent is incompetent.
And, finally, there are performance levels that can be produced by either a competent
and an incompetent incumbent. Upon observing such a performance, the voter will learn
nothing about the incumbent’s type. This is represented in the middle panel of Figure 1.1.
Lemma 1. Each level of public services induces the following posterior beliefs about the
incumbent’s competence:
(a) If the level of public services is high enough (g1 > 1 + b1), then the voter learns that
the incumbent is of high ability with certainty (µI = 1);
(b) If the level of public services is neither too high nor too low (2 b1 − 1 ≤ g1 ≤ 1 + b1),
then the voter learns nothing about the incumbent (µI = πI);
(c) If the level of public services is low enough (g1 < 2 b1− 1), then the voter learns that
the incumbent is of low ability with certainty (µI = 0).
From the standpoint of the incumbent, the amount of voter learning is therefore
a random variable. Further, the probability distribution over voter’s posterior beliefs
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critically depends on the budget that he handles for the provision of public services: the
larger the budget is, the more informative is his performance in office about his underlying
competence —as illustrated in the middle panel of Figure 1.1, the set of outcomes that
would lead to no learning shrinks as the budget increases. As a consequence, to the
incumbent there is a mapping from the budget that he handles today to the probability
that he is reelected at the end of the first period.
Lemma 2. The probability that an incumbent is retained in office depends on his electoral
status with respect to his challenger and on the first-period budget:
(a) If the incumbent is trailing, then he is reelected with Pr (g1 > 1 + b1) = πI b1/2; and,
(b) If the incumbent is leading, then he is reelected with Pr (g1 > 2 b1 − 1) = 1− (1−
πI) b1 /2.
This lemma gives us three main insights. The first is that the reelection probabilities
are contingent on the ex-ante electoral status of the incumbent. The reason is that voter’s
electoral decision (specified in (2)), together with the stark nature of the learning process,
results in different standards for reelection.
To see why, consider an incumbent’s electoral fortunes if his performance in office
results in no learning: while a leading one would be reelected with certainty (because
πI > πC), a trailing one would be removed (because πI ≤ πC). Put differently, the
burden of proof is harsher on a trailing incumbent: while he needs to prove himself to be
competent with certainty in order to be reelected, it is enough for a leading office-holder
to prove that he is not incompetent with certainty.
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The second insight regards the incumbent’s electoral valuation of the marginal effect
of increasing the budget he handles. From Lemma 2, it is easy to see that this marginal
effect is positive for a trailing incumbent but negative for a leading one. Indeed, this is a
result of the different standards for reelection. To the extent that a trailing incumbent
needs to prove himself, he craves for information revelation. He thus positively values
handling a larger budget because it would increase the informativeness of his performance
in office. And because a leading incumbent would be reelected absent new information,
he is information averse. To him, handling a larger budget would risk his relatively safe
electoral fortunes.
In my setting, the budget that the incumbent handles is not fixed. It is a function of
the first-period political decision of whether to privatize the public asset. If he chooses to
take some buying offer, then he would handle a higher budget —because privatization
would transfer to the present the future resources generated by the asset (see Montagnes
and Bektemirov 2018).
With these preliminaries, we can now turn to the elite’s problem of choosing how
much to offer for the asset. It follows from the above discussion that an offer would be
contingent on whether the incumbent is trailing or leading, given that an electoral status
determines the direction of an office-holder’s valuation of the marginal effect of increasing
the first-period budget.
We can start by considering a trailing incumbent.6 In general, he positively values an
6It is arguably of substantive interest to study the case of a trailing incumbent because, as some
existing literature suggests, there are settings in which politicians in power can experience an electoral
disadvantage by the very virtue of holding office (Klasnja and Titiunik 2017). Additionally, some literature
also argues that reelection rates can be very low in developing countries (Golden, Nazrullaeva, and Wolton
2020).
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offer to buy the asset: not only would it increase his chances of reelection, but it would
also expand his opportunity to build a strong legacy today —as he may not be in office
tomorrow. Faced with this incumbent, the elite will then have incentives to push down
their offer for the asset as much as possible, precisely because they anticipate his general
positive attitude towards privatization.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the incumbent is trailing and that the elite cannot engage
in information manipulation. Then, there exists a unique threshold π̂I(w) ∈ (0, πC ],
increasing in w ∈ (0, 1), such that
(a) If πI ≤ π̂I(w), then the elite offers λ = λ and the incumbent accepts; and,
(b) If πI > π̂I(w), then the elite offers λ
†(πI , w) ∈ (λ, 2), which is increasing in
πI ∈ (0, πC ] and decreasing in w ∈ (0, 1), and the incumbent accepts.
The above proposition tells us that, in equilibrium, the asset is always privatized when
the incumbent is electorally behind. This happens because, in general, this incumbent
positively values an offer to buy the asset: not only would it increase his chances of
reelection, but it would also expand his opportunity to build a strong legacy today —as
he may not be in office tomorrow.
In addition, it tells us that the price at which the asset is sold will critically depend
on the extent of his electoral disadvantage with respect to his challenger. When this
incumbent’s electoral outlooks are bad enough, then it is sufficient for the elite to offer
him the institutional reservation price (the lowest possible price at which the asset can be
sold). The key reason is that a pronounced electoral disadvantage implies a high chance
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that he performs poorly in the provision of public services, because the prior belief that he
is competent would be low. And since it is likely that he may not be in office tomorrow,
selling the asset cheaply would allow him both to build a legacy and boost his possibility
of changing his electoral fortunes by proving to be competent.
But as his electoral disadvantage decreases, then the likelihood that he produces good
outcomes increases —because the prior that he is competent would increase accordingly.
Why would the incumbent sell the asset too cheap if it would shrink his possibilities of
building a strong legacy tomorrow? After a threshold on the prior, the elite would need
to up their offer.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the incumbent is leading and that the elite cannot engage
in information manipulation. Then,
(a) If w < 1/2, then the elite offers λ‡(πI , w) ∈ (λ, 2), which is increasing in πI ∈ (πC , 1)
and in w ∈ (0, 1/2), and the incumbent accepts; and,
(b) If w ≥ 1/2, then the elite does not make an offer and the asset remains under public
ownership.
Contrary to the case of a trailing incumbent, Proposition 2 tells us that an electorally
advantaged office-holder may not be willing to privatize the asset. This is a consequence
of his aversion to an increase in the amount of voter learning if he privatizes. The more
he cares about office, the higher his incentives to reject an offer. For a leading incumbent
to be willing to sell, it must be the case that the weight that he attaches to office is not
too high —as he would rather not risk his chances of reelection otherwise.
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Figure 1.2: Endogenous Privatization Prices:
First-order distortions



















(b) High legacy motivation
Note. In the left panel, w = 1/2 which induces π̂I = 2/7; and in the right panel, w = 1/10 which induces
π̂I = 18/71. In both panels, πC = 1/2 and λ = 6/5.
As illustrated in both panels of Figure 1.2, Proposition 2(a) highlights that even when
a leading incumbent is open to privatization, he would never sell too cheaply: the prices
at which the asset would be sold are strictly above the institutional reservation price.
This happens precisely because the electoral fortunes of this incumbent are relatively safe.
Albeit selling would allow him to expand the legacy that he builds today, he would never
sell too low as it is likely that he also gets to provide public services tomorrow.
Remark 1. The following inequality holds in equilibrium: lim
πI→π−C
λ†(πI , w) < lim
πI→π+C
λ‡(πI , w).
Finally, consider the standpoint of the voter. Because the elite only makes an buying
offer only if the incumbent would accept anything below its market price (i.e. only if λ < 2),
the voter is hurt every time the asset is sold. The lower the equilibrium selling price,
the more the voter suffers. We can then think of the equilibrium privatization prices at
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baseline as first-order distortions when the elite can make take-it-or-leave-it offers for the
asset —but not yet engage in manipulation of information. As stressed by Remark 1,
and further illustrated in both panels of Figure 1.2, these first-order distortions are more
pronounced when the incumbent is trailing (due to his need for information revelation),
and are attenuated when he is leading (because of his aversion towards voter learning).
1.4.2 Second-order distortions: Allowing for information manipulation
From the analysis at baseline, we know that the privatization prices absent information
manipulation critically depends on the office-holder’s political motivations (the weights
he attaches to office and legacy) and on his electoral status with respect to his challenger.
Although the elite can obviously not affect the former, they could try to affect the latter
in order to try to reduce the prices that the incumbent would accept.
Before turning to the analysis, it is useful to recall that an information manipulation
strategy by the elite consists of an investigation and how to use it —which I denoted
by (Ω, a), with Ω denoting the investigation and a ∈ {0, 1} standing for using such
investigation to threaten (a = 0) or attacking (a = 1) the office-holder. Recall also that an
investigation would reveal information about the incumbent’s competence: if conducted,
it results in a public signal that he is incompetent (s = 0) or competent (s = 1), and each
signal induces the posterior beliefs Pr(θI = 1|s = 0) = µ0 and Pr(θI = 1|s = 1) = µ1.
Given the analysis in the previous section, we can also examine the implications of
the elite’s use of some investigation to attack or to threaten the incumbent. If the elite
attacks the incumbent before making their offer, then the investigation would result in
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a signal observed by all players, which would induce updated (posterior) beliefs about
the office-holder’s competence. Given this posterior, the elite may then present a buying
offer. Using the notation at baseline, we can denote the resulting privatization prices by
λ(µ0, w) after a signal of incompetence, and λ(µ1, w) after a signal of competence.
What is the likelihood that an investigation results in good or bad news about the
incumbent’s competence? In Bayesian persuasion, the larger the distance between a prior
belief and some induced posterior after a signal realization, the lower the unconditional
probability that such posterior is induced. For instance, if the posterior belief that would
be induced after bad news is closer to the prior than that posterior after good news
(πI − µ0 < µ1 − πI), then it is more likely that the investigation yields bad news —that
is, Pr(s = 0) > Pr(s = 1).7 From the elite’s standpoint, an attack is thus a lottery over
optimal buying offers (i.e., λ(µ0, w) or λ(µ1, w)), and where the lottery is defined by the
unconditional probabilities of good or bad news about the incumbent.
If, instead, the elite employs threats, then the incumbent’s refusal to take some offer
would trigger an investigation. Similarly, we can use the notation at baseline to denote the
privatization prices under threats by λ(πI , w | (Ω, 0)). This stresses that the privatization
prices would be determined by the prior beliefs about the incumbent’s competence (since
no new information would arrive at this moment in time) and also by the investigation
after a refusal.
With these preliminaries, we can start by investigating the case where the incumbent
7Formally, to push a posterior further down, the investigation would need to reduce the probability
of bad news conditional on the incumbent being competent. But then the unconditional probability of
bad news would shrink. And by the law of total probability, the unconditional probability of good news
would need to increase accordingly.
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is trailing. We know, by Proposition 1, that he sells relatively cheap because he needs to
prove himself to be competent with certainty in order to be reelected. From his standpoint,
privatizing is valuable as it would increase the informativeness of his performance in
office —and it can be so valuable for him to accept selling the asset at the institutional
reservation price.
Lemma 3. If the incumbent is trailing, then λ(πI , w | (Ω, 0)) ≥ λ(πI , w) for any πI ∈
(0, πC ], w ∈ (0, 1) and any Ω = {Ω(·|θI)}θI∈Θ.
The above lemma says that a trailing incumbent is immune to threats. To understand
why, suppose that the elite makes a privatization offer that carries a threat and that it is
rejected by the incumbent. From his viewpoint, his reelection chances may no longer lost
if his performance in office fails to reveal that he is competent with certainty, because
voters could still learn from the results of the investigation.8 Put differently, it is this
incumbent’s need for information that renders him immune to this strategy.
To the elite, a threat may rather be counterproductive as it could generate incentives for
the incumbent to reject their offer: by refusing to privatize and expecting the investigation
to be triggered as a consequence, he would expand his reelection chances since voters would
learn from two sources of information (his performance in office and the investigation).
And with an (at least weakly) better outlook at building a legacy tomorrow if he refuses
to sell, why would he sell the asset cheaper today?
With threats off the table, we can examine attacks. What posterior beliefs about the
8Notice that, even if good news cannot change his electoral fortunes (µ1 < πC), the incumbent would
still be strictly indifferent to such a threat.
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incumbent’s competence should bad or good news induce? From Proposition 1, we know
that the incumbent would accept to sell at the institutional reservation price whenever
the prior belief that he is competent is lower or equal than a critical threshold (πI ≤ π̂I).
Should bad news induce a posterior belief below that threshold value (i.e. some µ0 < π̂I)?
The answer is no.
As mentioned above, pushing such posterior belief further down the prior (and towards
zero) would only reduce the likelihood that it is induced —without any further gains as
the price cannot go any lower. To the elite, it is therefore more effective to have bad
news making the incumbent just willing to sell the asset at the institutional reservation
price (i.e. µ0 = π̂I). In addition, the elite does not want good news to turn the incumbent
into the leading candidate (i.e. induce some µ1 > πC). As emphasized by Remark 1 and
further illustrated in Figure 1.2, this would be detrimental because it would lead to an
upward discontinuity in the selling prices and, thereby, make the attack (which is a lottery
over later buying offers) too risky.
But what about good news inducing a posterior belief that keeps the incumbent with
a worst reputation than his challenger (i.e. some µ1 < πC)? By a similar reasoning,
shortening the distance between a prior belief and an induced posterior after good news
good would, in effect, increase the unconditional probability that such a posterior is
induced. Given the objectives of the elite, this cannot be optimal. Put together, the elite
wants good news to push this posterior up (to reduce the chances that it is induced) but
not too high for the incumbent to turn into leading. Good news should therefore make
the incumbent to be just trailing (i.e. µ1 = πC).
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Lemma 4. If the incumbent is trailing, then the elite’s optimal information manipulation
strategy is (Ω†, 1), where Ω† induces either µ0 = π̂I (the belief at which the incumbent
would accept to sell at the institutional reservation price) or µ1 = πC, with
Pr(s = 0) =
πC − πI
πC − π̂I
and Pr(s = 1) =
πI − π̂I
πC − π̂I
To illustrate the optimality of the information manipulation strategy in Lemma 4,
consider the case presented in Figure 1.3. Absent information manipulation, the elite’s
expected utility is 2− λ†(9/25, 1/10) ≈ 0.74, which is captured by the black dot along the
smooth black line of both panels.
Figure 1.3: Elite’s expected utility:














Note. Prior beliefs are πI = 9/25 and πC = 1/2; the institutional reservation price is λ = 6/5; and the
weight politicians attach to office rents is w = 1/10.
Lemma 4 tells us that the elite could do increase their expected utility by attacking
the incumbent before making the offer. The attack should be done with an investigation
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that induces the posterior beliefs (i) µ0 = 18/71 after bad news about the incumbent, and
(ii) µ1 = 1/2 after good news. In addition, it tells us that the unconditional distributions
of inducing each of these posteriors are Pr(s = 0) ≈ 57% and Pr(s = 1) ≈ 43%. If
the investigation is launched before making the offer to the incumbent, then the elite’s
expected payoff would be equal to:











After a signal of incompetence











After a signal of competence
≈ 0.75
which is an increase in expected utility that is captured by the white dot along the
smooth red line in Figure 1.3(b). It is important to notice that even though marginal
gains may seem small in this case, these margins are crucial in privatization settings
because public assets can be valued at hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars.9
Proposition 3. Suppose that the incumbent is trailing. Then, the belief threshold at which
the incumbent would accept to sell at the institutional reservation price, π̂I(w) ∈ (0, πC ],
is increasing in w ∈ (0, 1) and it determines the elite’s strategies as follows:
(a) If πI ≤ π̂I(w), then the elite does not engage in any information manipulation
strategy, offers λ = λ for the asset, and the incumbent accepts.
(b) If πI > π̂I(w), then the elite attacks the incumbent before making their offer, (Ω
†, 1),
9A similar point is made by Kang (2016) when studying the returns from lobbying in the energy
sector. In particular, he argues that although“the effect of lobbying expenditures on a policy’s equilibrium
enactment probability is very small[, ] the average returns from lobbying expenditures are estimated to
be over 130%” (294)
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which results in the following probability distribution:
(i) With Pr(s = 0), they offer λ = λ for the asset and the incumbent accepts; and,
(ii) With Pr(s = 1), they offer λ = λ†(πC , w) ∈ (λ, 2) for the asset and the
incumbent accepts.
This proposition stresses that when the incumbent would already accept to sell at the
institutional reservation price, there is no incentive to engage in information manipulation
since the price for the asset cannot go any lower. In addition, it highlights that attacking
the incumbent before making an offer is a gamble: an attack always carries the risk
of backfiring if the outcome of the investigation is good news about the incumbent’s
competence. In equilibrium, however, an attack is optimal because the possibility of the
investigation backfiring is optimally minimized.
We can now turn to the case when the elite faces a leading incumbent. From Figure 1.2,
we also know that for this incumbent to be willing to sell the asset, his office motivation
should not be too high —as the prospects of building a better legacy today following the
privatization would be of little value to him. In addition, by Proposition 2(a) we also know
that even when this incumbent is willing to sell the asset, absent information manipulation
by the elite he would never accept to sell at the institutional reservation price —which is
graphically captured by the upward discontinuity in Figure 1.2(b). In both cases, this
happens due to a leading incumbent’s aversion towards information revelation —recall
that, absent new information, this incumbent would be reelected with certainty. But then,
it is precisely this incumbent’s aversion to new information that can make him highly
vulnerable to both threats (a strategy that was off the table for the case of a trailing
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incumbent) and attacks.
What would be the optimal investigation to be used as a threat? Would it be different
than one used for attacks? It turns out that there exists a unique optimal investigation
against a leading incumbent, independent of how it is used. The reason is rather simple:
there exists a coincidence between (i) the elite’s incentive to exploit in their benefit the
price discontinuity that happens when the incumbent changes from leading to trailing,
and (ii) a leading incumbent’s least preferred investigation: one that, if conducted, would
maximise the chances of turning him into the trailing candidate.
To understand the above claims, consider possible posterior beliefs after bad news. If
a signal of incompetence pushes the beliefs down but not so much as for him to become
trailing (some πC < µ0 < πI), then the elite fails to exploit the sharp discontinuity of
prices. Thus, this cannot be optimal. If the elite pushes the posterior further down so as
for the incumbent to have a worse reputation than his challenger (some µ0 < πC), then
elite exploits the price discontinuity but it shrinks the likelihood of bad news being the
outcome of the investigation. To effectively achieve both objectives, bad news should turn
the incumbent into a just trailing candidate (i.e. µ0 = πC).
What posterior belief should good news induce? The elite could try to play it safe by
having good news inducing a posterior that is bounded away from fully revealing that
the incumbent is incompetent (i.e. πC < µ1 < 1). However, this would also increase
the probability that a such posterior is induced. It turns out that, in equilibrium, the
elite finds it optimal to fully minimize the chances of good news by way of incompetent
politicians never receiving them.
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Lemma 5. If the incumbent is leading, then for any a ∈ {0, 1} the elite’s optimal
investigation, denoted by Ω‡, induces either µ0 = πC or µ1 = 1 with
Pr(s = 0) =
1− πI
1− πC
and Pr(s = 1) =
πI − πC
1− πC
If a leading incumbent already dreaded the arrival of new information about his ability,
he dreads even more an investigation with the above features: good news occur if and only
if he is competent, and bad news are the most likely event even if he is truly competent
—which would flip his electoral fortunes for the worse.
Figure 1.4: Elite’s expected utility:














Note. Prior beliefs are πI = 7/10 and πC = 1/2; the institutional reservation price is λ = 6/5; and the
weight politicians attach to office rents is w = 1/10.
Given the optimal investigation against a leading incumbent, should the elite attack or
threaten him? We can begin by exploring attacks and, as an illustration, we can consider
the case presented in Figure 1.4. Absent information manipulation, the elite’s expected
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utility would be equal to 2− λ‡(7/10, 1/10) ≈ 0.08, which is captured by the black dot
along the smooth black line of both panels. But if the elite conducts the investigation given
by Lemma 5, which induces beliefs (i) µ0 = 1/2 after bad news and (ii) µ1 = 1 after good
news, with unconditional probabilities equal to Pr(s = 0) = 60% and Pr(s = 1) = 40%,
their expected payoff would be











After a signal of incompetence









After a signal of competence
≈ 0.57
which is an increase in expected utility that is captured by the white dot along the
smooth red line in Figure 1.4(b). It is straightforward to see that the significant increase in
expected utility is due to the elite’s possibility to exploit in their favour the discontinuity
in the selling prices. Yet again, attacks make the elite better off but only in expectation
because they carry a backfiring risk —which could be avoided by the use of threats.
Figure 1.5 illustrates that the extent to which threats can bring the prices down depends
on the incumbent’s electoral distance with respect to his challenger. To understand why,
consider the case in Figure 1.5(a) where the incumbent’s electoral advantage is very small
(he is barely leading). Then, by Lemma 5, the likelihood that he becomes the trailing
candidate if the investigation is conducted is very high.10 This likelihood is indeed higher
than if would choose to sell the asset for whatever price –recall that, by Lemma 1, the
amount of voter learning from his performance in office is (i) independent of the electoral
10Notice that lim
πI→π+C






distance with his challenger, and (ii) it is strictly lower than the investigation as the voter
can learn nothing (which would guarantee his reelection).
Figure 1.5: Leading incumbent:
















(b) High electoral advantage
Note. Prior beliefs are πC = 1/2; the institutional reservation price is λ = 6/5; and the weight politicians
attach to office rents is w = 1/10.
Against a barely leading incumbent, threats can hence be very effective: it would
sufficient for the elite to offer him the institutional reservation price, because his expected
utility from taking it (the white dot along the blue line) would be strictly higher than if
he refuses it (the white dot along the red line). To the elite, using threats then dominate
attacks. Not only would they avoid the backfiring risk of attacks, but they can bring the
selling price down to its institutional floor level.
But as the incumbent’s electoral lead increases, the chances that the investigation
turns him into trailing decreases —equivalently, the chances of good news start to increase
accordingly. As illustrated in Figure 1.5(b), the power of threats can be reduced to the
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point where the incumbent would not accept the institutional reservation price; he is
better off rejecting it and try his luck with voters learning both from his performance in
office and the elite’s investigation.
Although selling the asset cheaply may keep his chances of reelection high (as the
investigation would not be conducted), it would shrink the legacy that he is able to build
as an office-holder. In order to buy the asset, the elite would therefore need to up their
offer. Can this amount become large enough for the elite to change their strategy from
threats to attacks (which can backfire)? The answer is yes.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the incumbent is leading. Then, there exists a unique
threshold π̃I(w) ∈ (πC , 1) increasing in w ∈ (0, 1), such that
(a) If πI ≤ π̃I(w), then the elite threatens the incumbent, (Ω‡, 0), offers λ ∈ min{λ, λ‡
(
πI , w | (Ω‡, 0)
)
}
for the asset, with λ‡
(
πI , w | (Ω‡, 0)
)
increasing in πI ∈ (πC , 1) and decreasing in
w ∈ (0, 1), and the incumbent accepts.
(b) If πI > π̃I(w), then the elite attacks the incumbent before making their offer, (Ω
‡, 1),
which results in the following probability distribution:
(i) With Pr(s = 0), they offer λ = λ†(πC , w) and the incumbent accepts; and,
(ii) With Pr(s = 1), they offer nothing for the asset and it remains under public
ownership.
There are two key messages in the above proposition. The first is that the threshold
that determines the elite’s switch from using threats to attacks is increasing in the
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incumbent’s office-motivation. Indeed, the more he cares about holding office, the higher
his fear of this investigation being conducted after rejecting an offer.
As illustrated in Figure 1.6(a), a high enough office-motivation can make threats
sufficient for the elite to buy the asset at the institutional reservation price —rendering
attacks unnecessary altogether. Higher office-motivation implies a more frequent use of
threats and, by Proposition 4(a), it also lowers the offer that the incumbent would accept
for the asset.





















(b) High legacy motivation
Note. In the left panel, w = 7/10, πC = 1/2 and λ = 11/10, which induces π̂I ≈ 0.128. And, in the right
panel, w = 3/10, πC = 1/2 and λ = 11/10, which induces π̂I ≈ 0.114 and π̂I ≈ 0.676.
The second message of Proposition 4, which is illustrated in Figure 1.6(b), is that
attacks can emerge when the incumbent’s electoral lead becomes high enough and when the
weight that he attaches to office is low enough. Because this incumbent cares sufficiently
about his legacy and because the likelihood of bad news decreases along with his electoral
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lead, the decreasing effectiveness of threats triggers incentives for the elite to gamble
on attacking the incumbent before making an offer: if the attack is successful (the
investigation results in bad news), then the incumbent’s electoral fortunes would be turned
upside down and he would become the trailing candidate —who would accept a strictly
cheaper price for the asset given his demand for information revelation.
Finally, we consider again the standpoint of the voter whom, as emphasized in the
previous section, is hurt whenever the asset is sold below its market price. As illustrated
in Figure 6, the equilibrium privatization prices are significantly lower when the elite can
complement their buying offer with an information manipulation strategy (the red lines
in both panels) relative when they can only make offers (the black lines in both panels).
We can think of this as second-order distortions, which can actually be at odds than the
previously analysed first-order ones.
To understand the previous assertion, recall that in the absence of information ma-
nipulation, the voter suffered more when the incumbent was electorally trailing precisely
because of his need for information revelation. But it is now a leading office-holder which
can make the voter worse off, as he can even accept to privatize the asset at the lowest
possible price precisely due to his aversion towards new information.
Put differently, the findings in this section highlight that we cannot understand the
distortions that the elite can cause in the selling prices without considering their capacity
to threaten (Dal Bo and Di Tella, 2003; Wolton, 2020) but also to attack an incumbent
office-holder with manipulating the information that is available to voters about their
time-invariant characteristics, such as their competence.
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1.5 Allowing for savings
In this subsection, I allow for the incumbent to save the first-period revenues of the public
asset. To do this, I introduce a small modification to the model by expanding the action
space of the incumbent, who now also chooses an amount σ ∈ R+ of savings to be spent
in the second period.
In light of the analysis in the previous sections, it is somewhat straightforward to
see that, in equilibrium, an incumbent’s decision to save is stark. Consider a trailing
incumbent. If he craves for information revelation, why would he make his performance
in office less informative about his competence by saving part of the budget for spending
tomorrow? Indeed, a trailing incumbent saves nothing.
Table 1.2: Budget for public goods provision with savings
t = 1 t = 2
Control 1− σ 1 + σ
Privatize λ− σ σ
Consider now a leading incumbent. If he is averse to information, why would he not
choose to save everything today? By saving everything, we know by Lemma 1(b) that his
performance in office would be completely uninformative to the voter. As a consequence,
he would guarantee to be reelected with certainty, grab office rents and build his legacy
safely tomorrow.
Lemma 6. If the incumbent is trailing, then he does not save the revenues of the asset
(σ = 0); and if he is leading, then he saves everything (σ = b1).
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Substantively, the key endeavor is to understand how can expanding the incumbent’s
action space affect both the strategies of the elite and the privatization prices. As I argue
below, allowing the incumbent to save part of the budget can actually make the voter
worse off.
From the elite’s viewpoint, the possibility of savings does not affect the optimality of
their behaviour against a trailing incumbent. Against this office-holder, nothing changes
as he saves nothing; that is, he does not make use of his expanded action space. Thus, all
results remain as given by the previous sections.
However, an electorally advantaged incumbent does make use of savings. Further,
Lemma 6 tells us that this incumbent would save everything in order to shut down any the
informativeness of his performance in office. But then, the voter may be able to extract
information about this office-holder’s competence from one (and only one) information
source: the elite’s investigation. Were the elite to conduct the investigation, then to the
incumbent he would go from being a sure winner (since he would save all the budget for
spending tomorrow) to a possibly sure loser unless he proves himself to be competent
with certainty (since he may turn into the trailing candidate).
Proposition 5. Suppose that the incumbent is leading and that savings are allowed. Then,
the following inequalities hold in equilibrium:
(a) The elite engages in threats more frequently: π̃I(w|σ∗ = 1) > π̃I(w|σ = 0); and,
(b) Privatization prices weakly decrease: λ‡
(




πI , w |σ = 0, (Ω‡, 0)
)
.
The above proposition tells us that, when savings are allowed, all the results from
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the previous section continue to hold but with some caveats. First, the elite engages in
threats more frequently relative to the case when savings are not allowed. Intuitively, this
is a consequence of the leading incumbent being able to save everything to guarantee
his reelection: to the extent that the voter would only be able to learn from the elite’s
investigation, it puts them in a stronger position to exert influence. As a consequence,
the very threat of conducting the investigation can be further effective for wider values on
the prior beliefs about this incumbent’s competence.information manipulation, the elite
may be able to bring the privatization prices even further down.
1.6 Concluding remarks
This paper shows how an economic elite can complement their take-it-or-leave-it offers
for a public asset by manipulating information about the incumbent’s competence. By
attacking an incumbent office-holder (trying to uncover bad news about his competence
before his decision to sell) or threatening him (menacing to uncover bad news if he refuses
to sell), the elite can further reduce the equilibrium privatization prices.
I have shown how, in the absence of information manipulation, a trailing incumbent’s
need for information revelation makes him accept lower offers for the public asset relative to
a leading one —who is instead averse to the arrival of new information. But once we give an
economic elite the capacity to manipulate information available to voters about politicians
competence, the political incentives to privatize can reverse: a leading incumbent can
sell at a lower price than a trailing one precisely because of his aversion of information.
This reversal of incentives emphasize that we cannot understand the distortions in policy
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without taking into account elite’s capacity to manipulate the information that is available
to voters about office-holder’s time-invariant characteristics, such as their competence.
In addition, I have shown that although in general elite’s employ attacks against a
trailing incumbent and threats against a leading one, there are non-obvious subtleties
that emerge in equilibrium. In particular, optimal strategies can be non-monotonic
along voter’s prior beliefs about the incumbent’s competence: elites can employ attacks,
followed by threats, and back to attacks again. Understanding these non-monotonicity of
strategies are of substantive importance because of its different effects on the equilibrium
privatization prices, which can themselves become non-monotonic as a consequence.
Finally, it is important to note that the mechanism of influence that this paper studies
can also be applied to other policy domains —precisely because, as argued in previous
sections, it allows elites to harm any politician’s north star: his chances of being reelected.
Either if it is some policy with similar budgetary consequences as privatization —for
example, if the elite wants the incumbent to engage in borrowing in order to benefit from
the effects that public spending may have on fiscal multipliers; or if the political decision
involves an incumbent’s choice of a tax rate. An interesting area of future work is to apply
this form of influence to other policy domains, in order to study both the elite’s strategies
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. Let g+1 = {g1 : g1 > 1 + b1}, g−1 = {g1 : g1 < 2 b1 − 1} and g∅1 = {g1 : 2 b1 − 1 ≤
g1 ≤ 1 + b1}. Upon observing a performance level in g1 ∈ g+1 , Bayesian updating yields
Pr
(










g1 ∈ g+1 |θI = 1
)
Pr(θI = 1) + Pr
(











g1 ∈ g+1 |θI = 1
)
Pr(θI = 1) + 0 Pr(θI = 0)
= 1
The procedure is similar for the posterior induced by an outcome in g1 ∈ g−1 . Upon
observing an outcome in g1 ∈ g∅1 , Bayesian updating yields
Pr (θI = 1|g1 ∈ g∅1 ) =
Pr (g1 ∈ g∅1 |θI = 1) Pr(θI = 1)
Pr (g1 ∈ g∅1 |θI = 1) Pr(θI = 1) + Pr (g1 ∈ g∅1 |θI = 0) Pr(θI = 0)
=
Pr (2 b1 + η ≤ 1 + b1) πI
Pr (2 b1 + η < 1 + b1) πI + Pr (b1 + η ≥ 2 b1 − 1) (1− πI)
=
Pr (η ≤ 1− b1) πI

















which completes the proof.
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1.8.2 Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. Given the voter’s retention rule given by (2), an incumbent computes his re-election





= Pr (b1 (1 + θI) + η1 ≥ 2 b1 − 1)
= πI Pr (2 b1 + η1 ≥ 2 b1 − 1) + (1− πI) Pr (b1 + η1 ≥ 2 b1 − 1)
= πI + (1− πI) (1− Pr(η1 ≤ b1 − 1))
= 1− (1− πI) b1
2





= Pr (b1 (1 + θI) + η1 ≥ 1 + b1)
= πI Pr (2 b1 + η1 ≥ 1 + b1) + (1− πI) Pr (b1 + η1 ≥ 1 + b1)
= πI
(





which completes the proof.
For the proofs to follow below, I introduce the following notation: denote by e ∈ {0, 1}
the voter’s decision to oust or retain the incumbent, respectively; and denote by d ∈ {0, 1}
the incumbent’s decision to not privatize and privatize the asset upon presented some
offer λ ∈ (λ, 2) by the elite, respectively.
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1.8.3 Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. We find the price that leaves a trailing incumbent indifferent between selling and
not selling the asset. His expected utility from not taking the offer is
E [uI | d = 0] = E
[
(1− w) g1 + 1{e=1} (w + (1− w) g2) |d = 0
]




w + 2(1− w)
)
= (1− w) + (4− 3w) πI
2
(3)
Notice that E[g1|d = 0] < E[g2|d = 0, e = 1] because the second period legacy building
accounts for a selection effect: if a trailing incumbent gets reelected, it must be that he is
a high type with certainty. If he takes the privatization offer, his expected utility is
E [uI | d = 1] = E
[
(1− w) g1 + 1{e=1} (w + (1− w) g2) |d = 1
]












The incumbent is indifferent between selling and not selling the asset if and only if
E [uI | d = 0] = E [uI | d = 1]




(1− w) + (2− w) πI
2
)
⇔ λ = 2 (1− w) + πI(4− 3w)
πI(2− w) + 2(1− w)
:= λ†(πI , w)
58
Recall that λ > 1. It is easy to check, by inspection, that that lim
πI→0
λ†(πI , w) = 1 for
any w ∈ (0, 1), so he would always accept λ = λ. Suppose now that there exists some
w ∈ (0, 1) such that
lim
πI→1




⇔ w = 1
which is a contradiction, so it must be that lim
πI→1
λ†(πI , w) > 1. Consequently, there
must exist a value π̂I(w) ∈ (0, πC ] such that λ†(π̂I , w) = λ > 1. Algebraically (and this
will be useful for later in the analysis), we can recover this by solving
2 (1− w) + πI(4− 3w)




4− 3w − λ(2− w)
(5)
Finally, it is easy to verify that
∂λ†(πI , w)
∂w
= − 2 (πI)
2






((2 + πI)w − 2(1 + πI))2
> 0
which completes the proof.
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1.8.4 Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. As before, we find the price that leaves a leading incumbent indifferent between
selling and not selling the asset. To emphasize that his legacy-building prospects in the
second period has a richer selection effect, I write his expected utility from not privatizing
as
E [uI |d = 0] = E
[
(1− w)g1 + 1{e=1} (w + (1− w) g2) |d = 0
]




w + 2 (1− w)
)
+ Pr (g1 ∈ g∅1 )
(
w + (1− w)(1 + πI)
)










w + (1− w)(1 + πI)
)
=
3− 2w + (5− 4w) πI
2
(6)
And if he takes the privatization offer, his expected utility is
E [uI | d = 1] = E
[
(1− w) g1 + 1{e=1} (w + (1− w) g2) |d = 1
]










= w + λ
(





The incumbent is indifferent between selling and not selling the asset if and only if
E [uI | d = 0] = E [uI | d = 1]
3− 2w + (5− 4w) πI
2
= w + λ
(




⇔ λ = (4w − 3) + (4w − 5)πI
(3w − 2)− (2− w)πI
:= λ‡(πI , w)
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An incumbent is unwilling to sell if he would sell at a value higher than the asset’s
market price. That is, if
λ‡(πI , w) > 2
(4w − 3) + (4w − 5)πI > 2((3w − 2)− (2− w)πI)
(1− πI)(2w − 1) > 0
⇔ w > 1/2
from where it follows that if w ≤ 1/2, then λ‡(πI , w) ≤ 2. Assume henceforth that
w ≤ 1/2. It is easy to verify that lim
πI→1




1 + πI(2− 3 πI))
(3w − 2− (2− w)πI)2
< 0
⇔ 1 + πI(2− 3πI)) < 0⇔ πI < 0 or πI > 1





4(1− w)(2w − 1)
(3w − 2− (2− w)πI)2
< 0
⇔ w > 1/2
which is a contradiction. Therefore, it must be that ∂λ‡(πI , w)/∂πI > 0. With these two
insights, it is easy to verify that
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λ‡(πI , w) =
3
2
which implies that the incumbent never sells at the institutional reservation price
unless λ > 3/2 —that is, unless it is exogenously required to obtain at least 75% of the
asset’s market price.
1.8.5 Proof of Remark 1.
Proof. We know from Propositions 1 and 2 we know that (i) λ†(πI , w) is increasing
in πI ∈ (0, πC ] and decreasing in w ∈ (0, 1); and (ii) λ†(πI , w) is increasing both in
πI ∈ (πC , 1) and w ∈ (0, 1/2]. If there exists parameter values such that Remark 1 would
not to hold, then it would be under the following conjecture:






















which is a contradiction, thus proving that λ†(πI , w) < λ
‡(πI , w).
1.8.6 Proof of Lemma 3.
Proof. Suppose that the elite makes some privatization offer λ that carries the threat of
conducting Ω if the incumbent rejects. By accepting, his expected utility is as defined in
(4). But by rejecting it, his expected utility includes the results of the investigation.
62
To start, suppose that Ω induces a posterior µ0 < πI after s = 0, and some posterior
πC > µ1 > πI after s = 1. If so, then
E [uI | d = 0, (Ω, 0)] = E
[
(1− w) g1 + 1{e=1} (w + (1− w) g2) |d = 0, (Ω, 0)
]
= Pr(s = 0)
(




w + 2(1− w)
))
+ Pr(s = 1)
(








(Pr(s = 0) + Pr(s = 1)) + (Pr(s = 0)µ0 + Pr(s = 1µ1))
)
+
Pr(s = 0)µ0 + Pr(s = 1)µ1
2
(
w + 2(1− w)
)
and since Pr(s = 0) + Pr(s = 1) = 1 (by the law of total probability) and Pr(s =
0)µ0 + Pr(s = 1µ1) = πI (by the martingale property of Bayesian learning); then this
expected utility must be equal to that defined in (3). That is, we show that under this
conjecture then λ†(πI , w) = λ
†(πI , w | (Ω, 0)).
Suppose now that Ω induces a posterior µ0 < πI after s = 0, and some posterior
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µ1 > πC > πI after s = 1. If so, then
E [uI | d = 0, (Ω, 0)] = E
[
(1− w) g1 + 1{e=1} (w + (1− w) g2) |d = 0, (Ω, 0)
]
= Pr(s = 0)
(




w + 2(1− w)
))
+ Pr(s = 1)
[




w + 2(1− w)
)
+ Pr(g1 ∈ g∅1 )
(




(Pr(s = 0) + Pr(s = 1)) + (Pr(s = 0)µ0 + Pr(s = 1µ1))
)
+
Pr(s = 0)µ0 + Pr(s = 1)µ1
2
(
w + 2(1− w)
)
+ Pr(g1 ∈ g∅1 )
(
w + (1− w)(1 + µ1)
)
= E [uI | d = 0] + Pr(g1 ∈ g∅1 )
(
w + (1− w)(1 + µ1)
)
and since E [uI | d = 0, (Ω, 0)] > E [uI | d = 0], then it must be that λ†(πI , w) <
λ†(πI , w | (Ω, 0)). This completes the proof.
1.8.7 Proof of Lemma 4.
Proof. First, if λ†(πI , w) is concave along πI , then the elite’s expected utility as a function
of µ will be convex. Second, the voter’s retention rules causes the incumbent’s expected
utility along πI to be lower-semicontinuous which, in turn, implies the upper-semicontinuity
of the elite’s expected utility. As shown by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), these two
criteria would guarantee the existence of an optimal signal.
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2 (1− w) + πI(4− 3w)
πI(2− w) + 2(1− w)
)
=
8 (2− w)(1− w)2
(−2(1 + πI) + w(2 + πI))3
By inspection, it is easy to see that the numerator is positive. Suppose that the
denominator is positive as well. If so, then it must be that
(−2(1 + πI) + w(2 + πI))3 > 0








and, hence, it is concave along πI . Because the elite’s expected utility is equal to
2− λ†(πI , w), then it is convex along πI .
Given that now we know that an optimal signal exists, we need to derive it. As shown
by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), this solution is the concave closure of the elite’s
expected utility which, as illustrated in Figure 3, must induce beliefs µ0 = π̂I and µ1 = πC .




πI = Pr(s = 1)πC + Pr(s = 0) π̂I Bayes-plausibility
1 = Ω(s = 0|θI = 0) + Ω(s = 1|θI = 0) Law of total probability
1 = Ω(s = 0|θI = 1) + Ω(s = 1|θI = 1) Law of total probability
πC =
Ω(s = 1|θI = 1)πI
Ω(s = 1|θI = 1)πI + Ω(s = 1|θI = 0) (1− πI)
:= µ1
π̂I =
Ω(s = 0|θI = 1)πI
Ω(s = 0|θI = 1)πI + Ω(s = 0|θI = 0) (1− πI)
:= µ0
Solving these system of equations yields the following signal structure:
Ω(s = 0|θI = 0) =
(1− π̂I)(πC − πI)
(πC − π̂I)(1− πI)
Ω(s = 0|θI = 1) =
π̂I(πC − πI)
πI(πC − π̂I)
Ω(s = 1|θI = 0) =
(πI − π̂I)(1− πC)
(πC − π̂I)(1− πI)
Ω(s = 1|θI = 1) =
πC(πI − π̂I)
πI(πC − π̂I)
To verify that the above family of likelihood functions is a solution to the before-
mentioned system of equations, consider first the posterior beliefs induced following a
signal s = 0. We then have,
Ω(s = 0|θI = 1)πI












(1− π̂I)(πC − πI)













π̂I(πC − πI) + (1− π̂I)(πC − πI)
= π̂I
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A similar procedure corroborates that a signal realization s = 1 induces µ1 = πC . To
check the Bayes-plausibility, we look at
Pr(s = 1)πC + Pr(s = 0) π̂I =
(











(πI − π̂I)(1− πC)









(1− π̂I)(πC − πI)

























πI πC − π̂I πC + π̂I πC − πI π̂I
(πC − π̂I)
=
πI (πC − π̂I)
(πC − π̂I)
= πI
and we prove that the expected posterior is equal to the prior, so this investigation
is Bayes-plausible. Finally, the law of total probability for each pair of conditional
distributions (for s = 0 and s = 1) can be verified by inspection.
1.8.8 Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. All the equilibrium selling prices follow exactly from Proposition 1 and from Lemma
4. The only additional step left to show is that the incumbent’s expected utility is indeed
higher by using this investigation before making the offer. By using it, the elite’s expected
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utility is

















1− πC − πI
πC − π̂I
)(
2− λ†(πC , w)
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− λ†(πC , w)
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− λ†(πC , w)
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E[uE |No attacks] > E[uE | (Ω†, 1)]





− λ†(πC , w)
(
1− πC − πI
πC − π̂I
)





λ†(πC , w)− λ
)
:= ∆(πI , w)
Recall the selling price is strictly increasing in the incumbent’s legacy motivation.







































(2− λ)(πC − πI)









(πC − πI)(1− λ+ πI(2− λ))
(1 + πC)(1 + πC)
68
it is easy to see that the numerator is negative if and only if




⇔ πI < lim
w→0
π̂I(w)
which is a contradiction, since we are studying conditions in the domain πI ∈
[π̂I , πC ]. Therefore, it must be that lim
w→0
∆(πI , w) > 0 and, as a result, it must be
that E[uE |No attacks] < E[uE | (Ω†, 1)]. This completes the proof.
1.8.9 Proof of Lemma 5.
Proof. The elite’s optimal signal structure results from the investigation that minimizes
the incumbent’s expected utility. Given that the incumbent’s expected utility is lower
semi-continuous at the belief µ = πC , from an equivalent reasoning as in Lemma 4 it
follows that the optimal posteriors to induce are µ0 = πC after a signal that the incumbent
is of low ability, and a posterior µ1 = 1 after a signal that the incumbent is of high ability.
The signal structure is a solution to the following system of equations:
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
πI = Pr(s = 1) + Pr(s = 0)πC Bayes-plausibility
1 = Ω(s = 0|θI = 0) + Ω(s = 1|θI = 0) Law of total probability
1 = Ω(s = 0|θI = 1) + Ω(s = 1|θI = 1) Law of total probability
1 =
Ω(s = 1|θI = 1)πI
Ω(s = 1|θI = 1)πI + Ω(s = 1|θI = 0) (1− πI)
πC =
Ω(s = 0|θI = 1)πI
Ω(s = 0|θI = 1)πI + Ω(s = 0|θI = 0) (1− πI)
Solving these system of equations yields the following signal structure:
Ω(s = 0|θI = 0) = 1 Ω(s = 0|θI = 1) =
πC (1− πI)
πI (1− πC)
Ω(s = 1|θI = 0) = 0 Ω(s = 1|θI = 1) =
πI − πC
πI (1− πC)
To verify that the above family of likelihood functions is a solution to the before-
mentioned system of equations, consider first the posterior beliefs induced following a
signal s = 0. We would have that,
Ω(s = 0|θI = 1)πI

























A similar procedure corroborates that a signal realization s = 1 induces µ1 = 1. To check
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the Bayes-plausibility, we look at
Pr(s = 1) + Pr(s = 0)πC =
(



































(πI − πC) + πC
(






πI − πC + πC(1− πI)
)
= πI
which means that the expected posterior is equal to the prior. Finally, the law of total
probability for each pair of conditional distributions can be verified by inspection.
1.8.10 Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. Suppose that the elite makes some privatization offer λ that carries the threat of
conducting Ω‡ if the incumbent rejects. By accepting, his expected utility is as defined in
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(7). But by rejecting it, his expected utility would be
E
[




(1− w) g1 + 1{e=1} (w + (1− w) g2) |d = 0, (Ω, 0)
]
= Pr(s = 0)
(




w + 2(1− w)
)))
+ Pr(s = 1)
(



























)(4 + πI(3πC − 2)− 5πC
2(1− πC)
)
Define the difference between privatizing and not, by ∆(πI , πC , w) := E[uI |d = 0] −
E
[
uI | d = 0, (Ω‡, 0)
]












∆(πI , πC , w) =






πI > πC (Condition for being leading)
⇔ −πC(1− πC) > 0
which is a contradiction. Therefore, it must be that lim
w→0
λ→1
∆(πI , πC , w) < 0. By the
Intermediate Value Theorem, there must exist some ŵ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∆(πI , πC , ŵ) = 0.
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When w ≥ ŵ, then the incumbent would privatize the asset even at whatever institutional
reservation price —because λ > 1. We can recover a closed-form solution by examining
lim
λ→1
∆(πI , πC , w) = 0
w + 2πC(1− w) + πI(3w + 2πC(1− w)− 4)
2(1− πC)
= 0
⇔ w = 2(πC − πI(2− πC))







(1 + 3πI − 2πC(1 + πI))2
> 0
which implies that ŵ(πI) is increasing in πI ∈ (πC , 1). In addition, for the degenerate





1 + 2 πI
and this can be interpreted as an upper bound condition on how high his office






Suppose henceforth that w < ŵ so that he would not necessarily accept just any offer
of the exogenous reservation price. We can then recover the selling price by
∆(πI , πC , w) = 0
⇔ λ = 2 + πI(6− 4w)− 4w + πC(5w − 4 + πI(3w − 4))
(1− πC)(2 + πI(2− w) + 3w)
:= λ‡
(
πI , w | (Ω‡, 0)
)
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To examine its properties, we look at
∂λ‡
(




4(1− w)(2− w(2− πC))
(1− πC)(3w − 2− πI(2− w))2
> 0
⇔ w < 2
2− πC
which holds true for any πC ∈ (0, 1) since (i) when πC → 0, then w < 1, and (ii)
when πC → 1, then w < 2. Thus, λ‡
(
πI , w | (Ω‡, 0)
)




πI , w | (Ω‡, 0)
)
∂w
= −2(1− πI)(1 + πC − πI(1− πC))





πI < 1 (By assumption)
⇔ πC < 0
which is a contradiction. Thus, λ‡
(
πI , w | (Ω‡, 0)
)
must be decreasing in w ∈ (0, ŵ).
This value of λ‡
(
πI , w | (Ω‡, 0)
)
may be above or below λ ∈ (1, 2). Suppose that it is
above. The elite’s problem is to choose whether to engage in threats and buy the asset at
the before-mentioned price, or to attack the incumbent before making the offer. With
the aid of Proposition 1 and 2, we can compute their expected utility if they engage in
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attacks,
E[uE|s, (Ω‡, 1)] = Pr(s = 0)
(
2− λ†(πC , w)
)




















(2− λ†(πC , w))
which incorporates the fact that λ‡(1, w) = 2. The elite is indifferent between threats
and attacks if and only if
E[uE|(Ω‡, 0)] = E[uE|(Ω‡, 1)]





(2− λ†(πC , w))
⇔ πI =
5w − 4 +
√
32 + 16πC(w − 2)(w − 1) + w(33w − 64)
2(2− w)
:= π̃I(w)



















= 4(1− πC) > 0⇔ πC < 1
which completes the proof.
1.8.11 Proof of Lemma 6.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that a trailing incumbent’s expected utility is strictly
decreasing in savings. Recall that by Lemma 2(a), his chances of reelection are strictly
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increasing in the first period budget. If he would be purely office motivated and given a
choice to save, he would then save nothing. On the other hand, if he were purely legacy
motivated and given a choice to save, then his expected utility when he saves some amount











(1− w) g1 + 1{e=1} (w + (1− w) g2) | s, d = 0
] )




0 + 2(1 + s)(1− 0)
)
= −s2 πI − s(1 + πI) + 2 πI + 1 (8)
which is easy to see by inspection that it is strictly decreasing in s ∈ R+. Similarly, if











(1− w) g1 + 1{e=1} (w + (1− w) g2) | s, d = 1
] )




0 + 2s(1− 0)
)
= −s2 πI − s(1 + πI(1− λ)) + λ(1 + πI)
which is also easy to see by inspection that it is strictly decreasing in s ∈ R+. Logically,
it must then be the case that his expected utility is strictly decreasing in savings for any
w ∈ (0, 1).
Reversely, with a leading incumbent it is sufficient to show that his expected utility is
strictly increasing in savings. Recall first that, by Lemma 2(b) his chances of reelection
are strictly decreasing in the first period budget. If he would be purely office motivated
and given a choice to save, he would then save everything. On the other hand, if he is
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purely legacy motivated, then his expected utility when he saves some amount s ∈ R+,









(1− w)g1 + 1{e=1} (w + (1− w) g2) |s, d = 0
] )

















s2 (1− πI) + (3 + 5πI)
)









(1− w)g1 + 1{e=1} (w + (1− w) g2) |s, d = 1
] )



















+ λ(1 + πI) := ∆
a(s)
from where it’s easy to see that the it is a convex function in savings because
∂2∆a(s)/∂s2 = 1 − πI > 0. The optimal saving amount must be at a corner, but
notice that saving all or nothing equals the same amount λ(1 + πI), so he is indifferent
at this degenerate case. Logically, it must then be the case that his expected utility is
strictly increasing in savings for any w ∈ (0, 1).
1.8.12 Proof of Proposition 5.
Proof. We first need to compute the value of λ such that the incumbent is indifferent
between selling and not when the elite employs threats, taking into account that he would
save everything in the first period if he is leading and he would save nothing if trailing.
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His expected utility from not selling would be
E
[




(1− w) g1 + 1{e=1} (w + (1− w) g2) |d = 0, (Ω, 0)
]
= Pr(s = 0)
(




w + 2(1− w)
)))





w + 4(1− w)
)))
=
πC(1 + πI)(3w − 4)− 2(1− w) + πI(3− 2w)
2(1− πC)
and his expected utility from privatizing at some price λ would simply be
E
[




(1− w) g1 + 1{e=1} (w + (1− w) g2) |d = 1, (Ω, 0)
]
= w + λ(1− w)
(
Pr(g1 ∈ g+1 )2 + Pr(g1 ∈ g∅1 )(1 + πI)
)
= w + λ(1− w)(1 + πI)








uI | d = 1, (Ω‡, 0)
]
πC(1 + πI)(3w − 4)− 2(1− w) + πI(3− 2w)
2(1− πC)
= w + λ(1− w)(1 + πI)
⇔ λ = 2 + πI(6− 4w)− 4w + πC(5w − 4 + πI(3w − 4))
2(1− w)(1 + πI)(1− πC)
:= λ‡(πI , w | s, (Ω‡, 0))
For the incumbent to sell, the elite must offer at least the above amount. We now
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compute elite’s expected utility if they attack the incumbent, which is
E[uE|s, (Ω‡, 1)] = Pr(s = 0)
(
2− λ†(πC , w)
)




















(2− λ†(πC , w))
which incorporates the fact that λ‡(1, w) = 2. The elite is indifferent between
threatening and attacking if and only if
E[uE|s, (Ω‡, 0)] = E[uE|s, (Ω‡, 1)]











4(w − 1)(2 + w(πC − 2))
:= π̃I(w|s)
















which is strictly positive for any πC ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, as before, this threshold must
also be strictly increasing in w ∈ (0, 1).
Finally, it is easy to check that when the incumbent’s legacy motivation becomes




2(1 + p− C)−1 = lim
w→0
π̃I(w|s). In addition, recall







—otherwise, the incumbent would be willing to sell at any institutional reservation price.



















which implies that π̃I(w) < π̃I(w|s). That is, the elite employs threats for a larger set
of parameter values when the incumbent can save relative to the case when he cannot
save. As a corollary, it must be the case that the equilibrium selling price when the elite
employs threats is higher when the incumbent save.
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2 Stakes and Informativeness Trade-Off: Electoral
Incentives to Implement Programmatic Transfers
Chapter 2
The Stakes and Informativeness Trade-Off:
Electoral Incentives to Implement Programmatic Transfers
Abstract
If a transfers policy is programmatic (it is transparent and non-manipulable), is it
irrelevant for politicians’ electoral fortunes? I show that the answer is no with a political
agency model where politicians’ competence is uncertain to all. In my setup, an incumbent
can allocate a budget to public goods and transfers. These policies differ in one key
dimension: the provision of public goods provision fluctuates more over time relative
to transfers. When the incumbent increases the budget to public goods, two effects
arise: his performance in office today reveals more information about his identity (an
informativeness effect), and voters’ anticipation of narrow transfers tomorrow increases
the salience of political selection (a stakes effect). To the incumbent, these two effects
move in opposing directions and, consequently, the strategic allocation of the budget helps
him to advance his electoral fortunes.
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2.1 Introduction
Welfare transfer policies generally share two crucial properties: the criteria for redistribu-
tion is transparent and its implementation is non-manipulable by office-holders. These
features can be summarized into a single term: welfare transfers are programmatic. A
representative example is Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs), which consist of regular
and predictable payments to any household that meets pre-defined and well-specified
eligibility criteria (Ibarraran et al., 2017), with the societal objectives of providing income
support and encouraging human capital investment.
In their idealized conceptual form, the particular nature of programmatic transfers seem
to leave no room for electoral benefit to politicians. And yet, we see these programmes
being implemented widely across countries with varying levels of economic development
and can bear a non-trivial portion of a country’s budget. For instance, Fiszbein and
Schady (2009) document that Bolsa Familia program in Brazil has reached over 11 million
households, with an allocated budget of 0.36% of the GDP by 2005 (around $5 billion);
and, by the same year, Bono de Desarrollo Humano in Ecuador has reached over 40% of
the population, with an allocated budget of 0.6% of the GDP (around $194 million).
We are then left with a puzzle: how can these policies be implemented if they seem
to be irrelevant for policy-makers’ electoral fortunes? This puzzle appears to be further
reinforced in light of the existing causal evidence of the null effects that this type of
programs have on the incumbent’s vote share (see Green 2011; Imai, King and Velasco
2020), notwithstanding some of the commonly hypothesized mechanisms that could trigger
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electoral incentives for politicians to carry them out.11
This paper studies a probabilistic voting model with symmetric uncertainty (as in the
career-concerns tradition), in which politicians can be of high or low competence. In my
set-up, an incumbent politician can allocate a budget to public goods and programmatic
transfers. These policies differ in one key dimension: transfers have a higher persistence
of outcome relative to the provision of public goods. That is, once a transfers program is
set-up, these provide relatively stable payments to beneficiaries, whereas public goods
provision critically depends on the competence of the office-holder. Put differently, the
provision of public goods fluctuates more over time relative to transfers.
In addition, in order to capture the idealized features that this type of transfers should
have (see Stokes, Dunning and Nazareno 2013), I assume that voter eligibility for payments
is based on a commonly-known exogenous income threshold and that, once the program
is settled, it is non-manipulable by future office-holders in that eligible citizens would
receive the benefits today and tomorrow, regardless of who is in power.
I show that when the incumbent increases the budget to public goods by reducing
transfers, two effects arise. On the one hand, the incumbent’s performance in office today
would reveal more information about his underlying identity, which would thereby make
voters take an electoral decision with updated beliefs about his competence. I call this
an informativeness effect. On the other, the voters also anticipate that whoever is the
11One hypothesized mechanism is that incumbents may expect to claim credit for its implementation
(De la O 2013, 11). But, conceptually, this seems to be at odds with its non-manipulability feature, as
voters’ electoral decision should internalise that transfers would continue regardless of who is in power
—this is why Imai, King and Velasco (2020) contend “[w]hy voters would attribute responsibility when
none exists is unclear” (714). Another is that incumbents may expect rewards if, as argued by Finan
and Schechter (2012, 866), “receiving money engenders feelings of obligation” or reciprocity among
beneficiaries.
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office-holder tomorrow would administer a large budget for public goods. And since this
provision depends on the office-holder’s competence, voters will place a stronger weight on
political selection, relative to other factors —such as valence; for instance, the candidates’
charisma. I call this a stakes effect.
A key contribution of this paper is to show that the informativeness and the stakes
effects move in opposite directions for incumbent politicians. To understand this assertion,
take a leading politician; that is, a politician whose reputation (absent any additional
information) is higher than his challenger’s. On one side, he has incentives to reduce
today’s budget for the provision of public goods by increasing the size of transfers. By
doing this, he would increase the chances that voters learn little about him and, thereby,
keep his status as the leading candidate. On another side, the non-manipulability of
transfers implies that tomorrow’s budget for public goods would also shrink. But what
good is it to hold a better reputation for competence today when competence will matter
little for tomorrow’s welfare? Increasing transfers would then attenuate the very source of
the incumbent’s electoral lead.
The reverse rationale holds for a trailing incumbent; that is, a politician whose
reputation (absent any additional information) is lower than his challenger’s. It is
precisely because he holds a poorer reputation than his contender that increasing the
budget for transfers can be valuable: he would prefer voters to reduce the weight they
place on political selection. Yet, reducing the budget for public goods today would reduce
his chances of turning the table around by showing that he is competent.
There is, thus, a trade-off for the incumbent politician when he chooses a budget
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allocation. Which of these two effects dominate in equilibrium? In general, I show, the
stakes effect imposes itself over the informativeness effect. To see why, consider a leading
incumbent. The very fact that he holds a good reputation means that his chances of
performing poorly are relatively low. Why allow his fear of failure to bury his electoral
lead on competence by increasing transfers? It is precisely because he is more likely to be
competent than his challenger that he wants competence to be the first order priority in
voters’ electoral choice, and he can do this by increasing the budget for public goods.
Consider now a trailing incumbent. Although he could gamble on proving himself to
be competent by way of an outstanding provision of public goods, this can easily backfire:
a bad performance would make his electoral prospects even worse. Reducing the stakes of
the election by allocating everything to transfers is a safe alternative.
But “in general” does not mean “always”. There are cases where a trailing incumbent
prefers the lottery associated with the informativeness effect. If the incumbent is just
trailing against a challenger who is quite likely to be competent, then he would rather
allocate everything to public goods and gamble on proving himself: after all, being just
trailing implies that his chances of producing excellent results are very high.
There are also cases where the incumbent chooses a balance between transfer and
public good, playing on both the informativeness and the stakes effects. If the incumbent
is just leading against a challenger who is quite likely to be competent, then the chances
of a poor performance must be high too: why risk it when he could play it safe? Indeed, a
leading incumbent can find it optimal to balance the informativeness and the stakes effect:
keep the stakes high, but just as high as for his performance not to be too informative
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about his identity.
This means that the implementation of transfers is a function of circumstances,
especially the ex-ante difference in reputation between incumbent and challenger, with
potentially subtle consequences detailed above. This simple idea also has theoretical
implications for the empirical models that try to measure its electoral effects: we should
treat the very implementation of a programmatic transfers program as an equilibrium
object which, by its nature, should yield weakly positive effects on the incumbent’s
electoral fortunes.
2.2 Literature Review
Scholars have long studied politicians’ strategic problem of choosing how much budget to
allocate across public goods and transfers. A major strand of this literature have thought
about this in the context of electoral competition: equilibrium allocations are the outcome
of a political platform that maximises voters’ utility (see Persson and Tabellini 1999).
This is typically a world of prospective voting with few informational problems. But at
the same time, when we think about policy-making in political economy, there is also a
major strand of the literature that, building on a career-concerns framework (Holmström
1999), has studied incumbent’s incentives to strategically allocate effort or resources when
these provide information to voters about their competence (Persson and Tabellini 2002).
From a purely theoretical standpoint, this paper rethinks the allocation problem across
public good and transfers but from an informational standpoint.
To that end, I build on Ashworth, Bueno de Mesquita and Friedenberg (2017), who
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investigate a model in which a politician’s type and effort (in my paper, a budget) interact
in the production function of his performance in office, which triggers incentives to select
an effort level so as to manipulate the probability distribution over observable statistics. I
also build on Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2006), who study career-concern type
of model in which legislators need to divide resources across local goods and global
public goods, and where at election time voters can extract information about legislators
competence by observing the local public good but not the global public good (which
they observe after the election). My framework is a combination of these two insights,
with the incumbent’s problem being how to allocate a budget across public goods and
transfers, when these policies have different informational implications.
My model also builds on the agenda-setting and issue salience literatures. Scholars
have studied before an incumbent’s incentive to manipulate the scope of action of the
next office-holder; for example, through strategic debt contraction (Persson and Svensson,
1989) or issue manipulation (Aragones, Castanheira and Giani 2015). Within this work,
my model is closest to Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994). In their paper, policy-makers
can have preferences over productive and unproductive spending. He shows that the
incumbent policy-maker with preferences over unproductive spending can have incentives
to tie the hands of tomorrow’s office-holder: by collecting public resources inefficiently
today, he gets to reduce the importance weight on spending tomorrow and, as a result,
can increase his electoral prospects. My model is different in that the incumbent’s choice
of a transfers program allows him to simultaneously manipulate the information that is
revealed about his competence today and the importance voters place on having competent
leaders tomorrow.
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Importantly, this paper also speaks to the distributive politics literature that studies
politicians’ incentives to strategically allocate government goods and services, so as to
advance their political and electoral outlooks. This literature distinguishes between two
modes of distributive strategies: programmatic versus non-programmatic policies. In its
pure conceptual form, programmatic policies are (or should be) characterized by a set of
key features: goods and services are allocated to some general class of voters, regardless
of their geographical location (Golden and Min, 2013); the criteria for the selection of this
class of voters is common-knowledge and it can be subject to public discussion (Stokes et
al. 2013); and, once it is set, the program is non-manipulable by upcoming office-holders
(Imai et al. 2020). From a normative viewpoint, some scholars claim that programmatic
policies are what the “normal process of government” (Stokes et al. 2013, 9) should look
like.
But things are often not well-behaved in politics, where we can often observe spending
decisions that seem far from non-discretionary and transparent. This is the world of
non-programmatic policies, where the vast majority of scholarly work is concentrated and
which involves pork-barrel spending (Keefer and Kheman 2009), vote-buying (Schaffer
and Schedler 2007), among others (see Golden and Min 2013).
However, there is an emerging empirical literature that examines the plausible electoral
returns of programmatic policies. Some scholars have studied the returns of Brazil’s
CCT Bolsa Familia (Zucco Jr. 2013) and found positive effects. Others have focused
on Mexico’s CCT PROGRESA and found both null (Imai et al. 2020; Green 2011) and
positive effects (De La O 2013), as well as Mexico’s Seguro Popular de Salud and found
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null effects (Imai et al. 2020). From a theoretical standpoint, some literature has studied
president-legislator incentives to pass a CCT (De La O 2015); a mayor’s incentive to
manipulate the implementation of an exogenous programmatic policy to advance his own
electoral purposes (Frey 2020); or, somewhat more indirectly in a vote-buying setting,
the aforementioned voters’ feelings of reciprocity (Finan and Schechter 2012) with the
incumbent in charge of the implementation of the transfers policy.
Among this literature, this paper is to some extent closest to Manacorda, Miguel
and Vigorito (2011), who think about a model with rational though poorly informed
voters “who are unaware of the quasi-random nature of the PANES targeting rule” (4)
and, as such, beneficiaries interpret transfers as a signal of the government’s preferences
towards them. Their motivation for this assumption is that, under standard assumptions
of fully rational and well-informed voters, citizens that “are on both sides of the [eligibility]
threshold [of the quasi-random targeting of the PANES program] should hold the same
views of the incumbent’s competence” and, as a result, “their support for the incumbent
should not be affected by their own personal transfer receipt” (4).
This paper does not argue against the latter possibility. Instead, it tries to show how,
even in a world with voters that are fully rational, well-informed and forward-looking, the
incumbent would still have electoral incentives to implement this type of programs. As
such, if any of the existing hypothesized mechanisms are at play, these might provide even
further incentives for incumbents to bring them to fruition. Put differently, this paper
attempts to show that those alternative mechanisms are not necessary conditions for an
incumbent to have electoral incentives to implement programmatic transfers.
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Finally, my paper builds on the emerging literature of the Theoretical Implications
of Empirical Models, which employs game-theoretic tools to examine and to rethink
the counterfactuals that underlie experimental and quasi-experimental research designs
(see Bueno De Mesquita and Tyson 2020; Izzo, Dewan and Wolton 2020). I add to this
literature by laying out that the correct counterfactual for measuring the electoral effects
of a policy of high persistence and low informativeness, would specify voters’ behaviour
with a policy of low persistence and high informativeness.
2.3 The model
I study a two-period (t ∈ {1, 2}) game between a continuum of voters i ∈ [0, 1] and two
politicians (J), an incumbent (I) and his challenger (C). In the first period, the incumbent
can design a programmatic transfers policy which affects the per-period unit of budget
that is otherwise used for the provision of public goods. At the end of the first period,
each voter decides whether to retain the incumbent.
Politicians can be of “high” or “low” competence. The set of politicians’ types is
Θ = {0, 1}, each standing for low and high types respectively. At the start of the game, a
politician’s type (θJ ∈ Θ) is fixed but incompletely known to all players, who commonly
believe that Pr(θJ = 1) = πJ ∈ (0, 1).
The policies available to the incumbent differ in a key dimension: the provision of
public goods fluctuates more over time relative to transfers, as the former crucially depends
on the competence of the office-holder. The provision of public goods (pt) depends on a
production technology and a random shock. The production technology indicates how
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public goods are created from money: it maps the available budget (bt ∈ R+) and the
underlying competence of the office-holder into an outcome.
In any period t ∈ {1, 2}, the provision of public goods is given by
pt = bt θJ + ηt (1)
where ηt is the random shock, which is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
To capture in an stylized way the higher persistence of outcome of transfers, I assume
that the budget allocated to this policy does not interact with the office-holder’s competence
and there are no random shocks. In addition, transfers are “programmatic” in two main
aspects. The first is that, once it is settled, it is non-manipulable by upcoming office-
holders: beneficiaries expect to receive the transfers throughout the game, independently
of who is in power —an assumption that I later relax. The second is that the incumbent
has narrow discretion in its design: although he can set the per-capita transfer that each
beneficiary will receive, only an exogenous income threshold determines eligibility.
In the population, the distribution of income (yi) is given by some increasing and
continuous cumulative distribution function G(yi), with support on R+ and with an
associated probability density function g(yi). Among voters, any one with an income
yi ≤ ỹ will benefit from a per-capita transfer T ∈ R+, which size is determined by the






As consumers, voters’ have preferences over the consumption of private (ci) and public
goods (pt). Voter i’s utility is given by
ui,t = pt + ci
where private consumption is given by a voter’s disposable income
(
ci = yi + 1{yi≤ỹ}T
)
.
In addition to these payoffs from policy, I adopt a probabilistic voting framework to
capture all other sources of utility derived from voting for a candidate. For simplicity, I
assume that uncertainty operates only at the individual-level: each voter gets a payoff
of σi,I and σi,C from voting for the incumbent and the challenger, respectively, both of
which are drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Accordingly, politicians are purely
office-motivated in that they only care about maximising their share of votes.
The game proceeds as follows:
• Period 1:
0. Nature draws all random variables;
1. The incumbent chooses a budget of public goods provision (b ∈ R+) and, with
what remains, he sets a programmatic transfers policy (T(b) = 1− b);
2. Voters observe the incumbent’s performance and elections are held.
• Period 2:
1. The office-holder implements the transfers policy designed in the previous
period (T(b) = 1− b) and provides public goods (with a budget b ∈ R+);
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2. Payoffs are realized and the game ends.
The structure of the game is common knowledge. The office-holder’s allocation of the
budget is observed by all players. For simplicity and without loss of generality, I assume
that voters vote sincerely and that when a voter is indifferent between the challenger and
the incumbent, she elects the incumbent.
The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in pure strategies. In a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium, players’ beliefs are derived by Bayes’ rule on the equilibrium path;
a voter optimally decides whether to reelect the incumbent, given her beliefs about the
politicians’ types and her valence shock; and the incumbent chooses a budget allocation
optimally in anticipation of the voters’ voting strategy.
Finally, the following definition will be useful for the analysis:
Definition: Leading and trailing incumbent. An incumbent is leading if the prior
belief that he is competent is higher than the prior on the challenger (πI ≥ πC); otherwise
(πI < πC), he is trailing.
2.3.1 Comments on the model
There are two points worth stressing. The first relates to the higher persistence of outcome
of transfers relative to the provision of public goods. Perhaps the most straightforward
way to justify this assumption is to look at the policies’ differences in their key obstacles
for a successful implementation. In the case of Conditional Cash Transfers, which is a
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representative example of programmatic transfers, researchers identify as a key obstacle a
country’s “administrative capacity” as it can hinder “the speed with which information
on compliance becomes available to trigger sanctions” (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009, 325).
We can contrast this obstacle of monitoring compliance with the problems present
in infrastructure projects, which researchers argue to include “cost overruns, delays (...)
failed procurement [and even] frequent design changes” that, under poor management,
can result in them being “canceled or abandoned after significant up-front investment”
(Beckers and Stegemann 2013). I interpret these differences in the nature of obstacles as a
proxy of the inherent level of complexity that each task involves, with transfers being less
convoluted and thereby less fluctuant over time than public goods provision.
The second point concerns the assumption that the implementation of transfers is
non-manipulable by future office-holders. This assumption is made precisely because of
the theoretical objectives of this paper: to show how, even if politicians are only able
to implement programmatic transfers in their idealized shape, strategic incentives can
emerge. Nonetheless, this assumption is stronger than needed. All results would hold
under partial persistence of transfers: for instance, if it is politically too costly to withdraw
transfers benefits from some share of citizens. I develop an extension that endogenizes
the challenger’s decision to agree or disagree with the continuity of a transfers policy.
2.4 Analysis
Working through backwards induction, in the second period the office-holder has no
strategic options: he implements the transfers policy set by the previous administration
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(because programmatic transfers are persistent) and provides public goods. Thus, all the
strategic tensions concentrate in the first period.
By the end of the first period and after observing the incumbent’s performance in office,
voters think about tomorrow with updated beliefs about his competence —which I denote
by Pr(θI = 1 | p1) = µI ∈ [0, 1]. This posterior belief, together with the individual-level
valence shock and the budget for public goods tomorrow, create the vote share of the
candidates.
Voter i with income yi votes for the incumbent if and only if
E[ui,2 |µI ] + σi,I ≥ E[ui,2 |πC ] + σi,C
σ̃i ≤ b (µI − πC)
where σ̃i = σi,C − σi,I . Given the distributional assumptions of valence and income in
a population that consists of a mass of voters of size one, the incumbent’s vote share is
∫
yi
Pr (σ̃i ≤ b (µI − πC)) dG(yi) = F
(
b (µI − πC)
)
where the right hand side represents the continuous cumulative distribution function
of σ̃i, which is a random variable resulting from the subtraction of the two valence shocks
at the individual-level.
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Remark 1. The incumbent’s vote share satisfies
F
(






+ b (µI − πC)
(
1 + b (µI−πC)
2
)
if µI < πC
1
2





if µI ≥ πC
Anticipating how his share of the votes emerge, from the incumbent’s viewpoint
the budget for public goods that he chooses today has a direct impact on his electoral
fortunes tomorrow. To illustrate this, suppose that he would choose to allocate nothing to
public goods (b = 0) and set a pervasive transfers program (T(0) = 1). This will be our
benchmark.
By Remark 1, it follows that voters will place a weight of zero on the importance of
selecting good politicians: without a budget for public goods tomorrow, the candidates’
ability is rendered trivial and the electoral outcomes would be purely determined by
valence —a candidate’s charisma, etc.
Suppose now that the incumbent would instead choose a positive budget for public
goods today (b > 0) —and, thereby, he would reduce the size of the programmatic transfers
policy (T(b) < 1). Then, the relevance of political selection in voters’ electoral decision
would be amplified: the role of valence in the election is displaced by the candidates’
expected performance in the policy arena.
I call this an stakes effect: the electoral effect of changing the weight that voters place
on selecting competent politicians from what it would be when the incumbent allocates a
budget of zero to public goods, to what it would be when he allocates a positive budget
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to public goods, holding the voters’ beliefs fixed. Formally, we can define this by







where implicit above is that the share of votes are equally split among the candidates
when there is no budget for public goods tomorrow, as the distribution of valence in the
population is symmetrical around zero. The incumbent’s valuation of the stakes effect
will be given by the sign of (2) —if the sign is positive (negative), then he benefits (is
harmed) from the stakes effect.
Lemma 1. Fix a budget for public goods provision (b ∈ R+). If πI < πC, then
β(0, b | πI , πC) < 0; otherwise (πI > πC), then β(0, b |πI , πC) > 0.
This lemma tells us that an incumbent’s valuation of the stakes effect is utterly given
by his electoral status with respect to his challenger. To see why this is the case, consider
a leading incumbent. Everything else being equal, he wants to reap electoral rewards
from having a gleaming reputation: he is more likely to be competent than his challenger,
and he wants voters to make this a priority when they cast their ballot. As illustrated in
Figure 2.1(a), the stakes effect must then be positive.
Moreover, the magnitude of this effect should be strictly increasing is his electoral lead,
as voters would expect him to outperform his challenger in providing public goods. Put
equivalently and as illustrated in Figure 2.1(b), to a leading incumbent the marginal effect
of decreasing the budget allocated to public goods would be negatively evaluated, and the
magnitude of this negative evaluation would grow along the extent of his electoral lead.
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(b) Decreasing the stakes
Note. In both panels, the black line is β(0, 1 |πI , 2/5); in the right, the red dashed line is β(0, 1/2 |πI , 2/5).
Contrarily, a trailing incumbent has no incentives for political selection to matter
more in the election by way of increasing the budget to public goods: he has a poorer
reputation than his challenger, and he would therefore gain if this fact became irrelevant
in voters’ choice.
By decreasing the budget to public goods and, thereby, increasing the size of transfers,
he can attenuate the very source of his electoral trail. As illustrated in Figure 2.1(a),
the stakes effect must be negative. And the larger the extent of his electoral trail, the
stronger his incentive to decrease the stakes of the election: as shown in Figure 2.1(b), the
marginal effect of decreasing the budget for public goods is positive and its magnitude
grows along the level of trail.
Naturally, increasing or decreasing the budget for public goods provision does not
only have an stakes effect. From the incumbent’s viewpoint, it also affects the way voters
update about his underlying competence since it influences his first-period performance.
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This induces an informativeness effect, to which I now turn to.
As in Izzo (2020), the learning process is stark: players learn everything or nothing
about the incumbent, upon observing the first-period level of public goods provision. For-
mally, this happens because of the random shock being drawn from a uniform distribution.

























Note. All points within the dashed black (blue) lines are outcomes that can be produced by a competent
(incompetent) politician.
To understand how full learning is induced, consider the left panel of Figure 2.2. The
set of outcomes in upper shaded area can never be produced by a low ability politician,
even if the random shock takes its highest positive value. Therefore, an outcome in this
area would induce a belief that he must be of high ability with certainty.
Similarly, a high ability politician can never produce outcomes in the shaded area of
the right panel, even if the random shock takes its lowest negative value. An outcome in
this area would induce a belief that he must be of high ability with certainty.
Finally, consider the set of outcomes in the shaded area of middle panel. These are
outcomes that can be produced both by a competent and an incompetent incumbent.
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Upon observing an outcome in this area, the voter learns nothing.
Lemma 2. Each level of public goods provision induces the following posterior beliefs
about the incumbent’s competence:
(a) If the level of public goods provision is high enough (p1 > 1), then voters learn that
the incumbent is of high ability with certainty (µI = 1);
(b) If the level of public goods provision is neither too high nor too low (b ≤ p1 ≤ 1),
then voters learn nothing about the incumbent (µI = πI);
(c) If the level of public goods provision is low enough (p1 < b), then voters learn that
the incumbent is of low ability with certainty (µI = 0).
To the incumbent, the fact that this policy is informative about his competence implies
that the budget that he allocates it induces a lottery over vote shares: a budget for public
goods induces a probability distribution over observable statistics (a performance level);
each statistic induces a posterior belief about his underlying competence; and, by Remark
1, each posterior induces his share of votes at the end of the first period.
Lemma 3. The budget allocated for public goods provision (b ∈ R+) induces a lottery
over vote shares. This lottery has the following probability distribution:
(a) With probability Pr (p1 > 1) = πI b, his vote share is F (b (1− πC));
(b) With probability Pr (b ≤ p1 ≤ 1) = 1− b, his vote share is F (b (πI − πC)); and,
(c) With probability Pr (p1 < b) = (1− πI) b, his vote share is 1− F (b πC).
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To illustrate this, consider the benchmark: the incumbent allocates nothing to public
goods (b = 0) and sets a pervasive transfers program (T(0) = 1). Indeed, this would result
in a degenerate lottery in which players will learn nothing about him with probability
one. As highlighted in Figure 2.3, all performance outcomes will fall within the area
that induce no learning. By doing this, the incumbent can be certain that information
revelation will not be the source of an electoral effect.




























Note: In all panels, the thick red lines are the ex-ante possible levels of public goods provision that can
be delivered by an incumbent, given some budget.
Suppose now that the incumbent would instead choose a positive budget for public
goods (b > 0). Then, this lottery would be non-degenerate in that voters could learn his
true identity with positive probability. The outcomes that would result in null learning
shrink as we move from no budget (b = 0) to a positive budget (b > 0). The incumbent
would then expect information revelation to be the source of an electoral effect since new
information can accrue.
With these preliminaries, I am ready to define the informativeness effect: the electoral
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effect of changing the probability that voters learn about the incumbent’s competence
from what it would be when the incumbent does not allocate any budget to public goods,
to what it would be when he allocates a positive budget to public goods, holding the
respective budgets fixed. Formally, we can define this by















where implicit above is that the electoral effect of the degenerate lottery (no budget
for public goods and everything to transfers) is effectively zero, because no information
would be revealed with certainty. The incumbent’s valuation of this effect will be given
by the sign of (3) —if the sign is positive (negative), then he benefits (is harmed) from
the informativeness effect.
Lemma 4. Fix a budget for public goods provision (b ∈ R+). Then, there exists a unique
threshold πaI (πC) ∈ (0, 1) increasing in πC ∈ (0, 1) such that (i) ν(0, b |πI , πC) > 0 if
πI < π
a
I , and (ii) ν(0, b |πI , πC) < 0 if πI > πaI .
To start, consider a leading incumbent. Albeit being ahead of his contender, a very
good performance in the provision of public goods can further his electoral advantage
if he proves to be competent: he has incentives to gamble on a successful performance.
But because it is a gamble, it can backfire: a poor performance could reveal that he is
incompetent and, thereby, turn him into a trailing candidate; that is, he experiences fear
of failure.
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Note. The black lines in the left and right panels are ν(0, 1 |πI , 45/100) and ν(0, 1 |πI , 55/100), respec-
tively. The y-axis of both panels have the same scale.
The incumbent’s valuation of the gamble will hinge on the voters’ ex-ante assessment
of the extent of his electoral lead and on how confident he is that he will not performing
poorly. For example, consider the situation depicted in Figure 2.4(a) where the challenger
is more likely to be incompetent than competent.
When the incumbent’s electoral lead is narrow, his fear of failure dominates his
incentives to gamble on success: being very close to his likely incompetent challenger, the
incumbent evaluates that it is also more likely than not that he will not produce a good
enough outcome. He fears losing his lead altogether if he opens up information revelation.
And notice that as the prior belief on the incumbent increases, his fear of failure still
dominates. This happens not because the he does not increasingly expect to produce
a good outcome, but because he assesses that there is little to gain by separating even
further away from his challenger by proving to be competent: his growing electoral lead
makes him want to play it safe. Overall, he evaluates the informativeness effect to be
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strictly negative.
But this negative evaluation is not strict for any parameter configuration. Consider the
situation depicted in Figure 2.4(b), where the challenger is more likely to be competent
than incompetent. When the incumbent’s lead is tight, he is now confident enough to
prove himself: his incentives to gamble on success dominate his fear of failure, and hence
he evaluates the informativeness effect to be positive. And, as before, as the prior belief
that he is competent increases, his fear of failure overcomes as he would rather play it
safe.
Let us now turn to the incentives of an incumbent who is electorally trailing. To him,
information revelation provides him a way out his trail: his incentive to gamble on success
must be very high and, thus, he must broadly positively evaluate the informativeness
effect. Both panels of Figure 2.4 illustrate this, but with an intuitive caveat.
When both himself and his challenger are likely to be incompetent, then his fear of
failure can overwhelm him when his electoral trail is tight. This is because he estimates a
bad performance to be likely if he tries to prove himself, which would be unwarranted
because his electoral distance is not too pronounced. He would rather conform with a
slightly lower vote share than his challenger and play it safe.
With these insights, Figure 2.5 depicts an incumbent’s estimate of the marginal effect
of decreasing the informativeness of his performance —by way of increasing the budget
allocated to transfers. Precisely because a leading incumbent experiences fear of failure,
he positively evaluates increasing the budget to the transfers policy in order to reduce the
amount of information revelation. In contrast, from the standpoint of a trailing incumbent,
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information revelation is what would allow him to demonstrate that he is more competent
than his challenger: decreasing the budget to public goods is negatively evaluated since
information revelation is what could allow him to turn his reputation around.

















Note. The red dashed lines in the left and right panels are ν(0, 1/2 |πI , 45/100) and ν(0, 1/2 |πI , 55/100),
respectively. The y-axis of both panels have the same scale.
To summarize the analysis above, when the incumbent moves from allocating nothing
to public goods (b = 0) to allocating a positive budget (b > 0), it has a total effect on his
expected vote share, which I denote by τ(0, b |πI , πC). This total effect can be decomposed
into an informativeness and a stakes effect. The incumbent’s problem is to optimally set
the budget that he allocates to the provision of public goods.
We can write the solution to his problem as choosing an allocation to public goods
that maximises its total effect; that is, the incumbent solves
b∗ ∈ arg max
b∈R+
τ(0, b |πI , πC)
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From the insights of Lemma 1 and Lemma 4, we know that the informativeness and
the stakes effects impose a trade-off to the incumbent because, to him, these two go in
opposing directions. Take a leading incumbent. To him, the informativeness effect is
positive: his fear of failure makes him value a marginal increase in transfers in order to
keep his reputation untarnished; but the stakes effect is negative: what good is it to hold a
better reputation for competence today when competence will matter little for tomorrow’s
welfare?
Informally, we can grasp this trade-off in terms of a popular saying: a leading incumbent
knows that he cannot have the cake (decrease the budget to public goods by increasing
transfers so as to keep his reputation untarnished) and eat it, too (reap electoral rewards
from a gleaming reputation). Which of these two effects dominate in equilibrium?
Proposition 1. Suppose that the incumbent is leading. Then, there exists a unique
threshold π†(πC) ∈ [πC , 1) decreasing in πC ∈ (0, 1) such that
(a) b∗(πI) ∈ (0, 1) and strictly increasing in πI ∈ (πC , 1) if πI ∈ (πC , π†(πC)); and,
(b) b∗(πI) = 1 if πI ≥ π†(πC).
Proposition 1(b) tells us that when the incumbent’s electoral lead grows high enough,
he would rather have the stakes of the election at its highest by allocating everything to
public goods provision and nothing to transfers. This result is not obvious since we know,
by Lemma 4, that the informativeness effect is broadly negative for him. Yet it turns out
that, in equilibrium, he is willing to keep the stakes high and take the risk of losing his
reputation.
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He is better off with this decision because a high enough electoral lead implies a
low enough probability that he performs poorly: his fear of failure is relatively small.
Confident enough that his first-period performance will improve further voters’ evaluation
of his competence, he would rather have an election with high stakes.
However, Proposition 1(a) stresses that it is the electoral distance with his challenger
which determines whether taking such a risk is warranted. A lower reputation implies a
higher fear of failure which, in turn, generates incentives to decrease the informativeness
of his performance in office even if it decreases the stakes of the election. Though, this
can only happen when the expected competence of his challenger (πC) is low enough.
When this is the case, then the incumbent prefers a smooth allocation across transfers
and public goods. This is illustrated in Figure 2.6(a): through a prudent allocation, he
keeps the stakes of the election high but not too high so as to spoil his electoral fortunes
by revealing too much information.
A direct implication is that as the prior on the challenger being competent decreases,
it must be the case that for him to shut down entirely transfers the prior must be very
high: the threshold condition (π†(πC)) is thus decreasing on the prior on the challenger
because his incentives to play it safe decrease accordingly.
The reverse rationale holds for a trailing incumbent. It is precisely because he holds a
poorer reputation than his challenger that, with respect to the stakes effect, the marginal
effect of increasing transfers would be valuable: he gets to push to the background voters’
concern on selecting good politicians. Yet, with respect to the informativeness effect, the
marginal effect of reducing the budget for public goods today would hinder his chances
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of turning the table around by proving to the electorate that he is more likely to be
competent than this contender.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the incumbent is trailing. Then, there exists a unique
threshold π‡(πC) ∈ (0, πC) increasing in πC ∈ (0, 1) such that
(a) b∗(πI) = 0 if πI < π
‡; and,
(b) b∗(πI) = 1 if πI ≥ π‡.
Proposition 2 tells us that, to a trailing incumbent, the optimal transfers policy is
stark: either everything to transfers or everything to public goods. Moreover, it tells us
that this decision depends on the acuteness of his electoral trail. To see why, suppose that
he faces a challenger likely to be incompetent.






































Note. In the left panel, πC = 2/5 and π
† ≈ 0.619; and in the right panel, πC = 7/10 and π‡ ≈ 0.641.
If this is the case, then he evaluates that the chances that he produces a good enough
outcome must be low —he is even less likely to be competent than his contender after all.
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Although he may not be confident enough to gamble on information revelation cutting his
trail, he still was an easy way out: shutting down altogether the importance of selecting
good politicians. Good bye, political selection; and welcome, valence-based electoral race.
Naturally, his incentive to shutdown political selection is intensified as his challenger
becomes more likely to be competent. But only up to a point. This is the content of
Proposition 2(b), which is depicted in Figure 2.6(b): when the challenger is likely to be
competent and the incumbent’s trail is tight enough, then he can find it optimal to put all
of his coins on gambling on success. After all, under this situation he is also more likely
to be competent and chances are that he gets to turn the table around. With a good
enough outlook to prove himself, he is better off allocating everything to public goods
provision and nothing to transfers.
2.5 Endogenous agreement with a transfers policy
As it was mentioned in a previous section, that transfers are non-manipulable once these
are set-up is one of the key features for these to be programmatic. It is precisely this
which, conceptually, should render an incumbent impotent from claiming credit for its
implementation, as voters’ electoral decision would internalise that they would receive
payments regardless of who is in power. While it was a helpful assumption in the basic
model to take this as a given, it can be seen as substantively problematic.
To address this concern, this section investigates conditions for an agreement of
continuity of transfers to be possible among the candidates; that is, the conditions for a
transfers policy set by the incumbent to endogenously achieve the status of “programmatic”
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—as a corollary, in the absence of agreement such transfers policy would be conceptualised
as “non-programmatic”. To this end, I make two modifications to the model. Suppose now
that the incumbent sets a transfers policy, after which the challenger credibly commits to
continuing it or not if he is elected: A ∈ {0, 1}, each standing respectively for reject and
accept. And to keep things simple, suppose that the action space for the incumbent is
to allocate the whole of unit of budget to either transfers or public goods: T(b) ∈ {0, 1}
—this would allow me to derive clean closed-form solutions. Everything else remains as
before.
By Remark 1, we know that the if the incumbent exhausts the budget in the transfers
policy and the challenger agrees, then they equally split the share of the votes: with no
budget for public goods tomorrow, political selection is rendered trivial in voters’ electoral
decision —and, by assumption, the resulting valence shock is symmetrical around zero.
The additional component that we need to derive in this section is the share of votes if
the incumbent sets a transfers policy but the challenger decides to reject its continuity
if he gets to be in office. Formally, suppose that the incumbent allocates everything to
transfers and the challenger commits not to continue it if elected.
Proceeding backwardly and from the challenger’s viewpoint, at the time of the election
voter i with income yi prefers to vote for the challenger if and only if
E[ui,2 |µI ] + σi,I ≤ E[ui,2 |πC ] + σi,C





which incorporates that beneficiaries receive a per-capita amount satisfying the
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balanced-budget constraint T G(ỹ) = 1. Given the distributional assumptions of va-



















Mass of ineligible voters
(4)
It is apparent that the decision not to uphold the continuity of transfers makes the
challenger suffer among the mass of citizens eligible to become beneficiaries, as they would
forsake receiving transfers if he gets to hold office. By inspection, it is also apparent that
disagreement is positively evaluated by the mass of ineligible voters although this support
depends itself in their expectation of his performance in public goods provision.
Lemma 5. Suppose that the incumbent allocates all the budget to a transfers policy
(T(0) = 1). Then, there exists a unique threshold π̂C(G(ỹ)) ∈ (0, 1) which is increasing in
G(ỹ) ∈ (0, 1) such that
(a) R=0 if πC > π̂C(G(ỹ)); and,
(b) R=1 if πC < π̂C(G(ỹ)).
This lemma tells us that refusing the continuity of transfers is optimal when the
challenger’s expected quality is high enough, and that this threshold is decreasing in
the mass of non-eligible voters: as depicted in Figure 2.7(a), the higher the share of
eligible voters, the higher the cost of disagreement and, hence, the higher the prior on the
incumbent’s competence must be in order for him to disagree to continue the transfers
program if he gets to office.
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Anticipating the challenger’s optimal behaviour, the incumbent must decide whether to
exhaust the budget in transfers. Suppose that the conditions are such that the challenger
would disagree. To him, the stakes effect plays a strong role: if the challenger promises
public good because the prior on his competence is high enough, then he can still decrease
the stakes of the election by committing to transfers.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the incumbent can only allocate the unit of budget either to
transfers or to public goods provision. Then, there exists a unique threshold π̂I(πC , G(ỹ)) ∈
(0, 1) which is increasing in G(ỹ) ∈ (0, 1) and πC ∈ (0, 1), such that
(a) T(0) = 1 if πI < π̂I ; and,
(b) T(1) = 0 if πI ≥ π̂I .
The incumbent then needs to evaluate if he is better off adopting a transfers policy,
having it rejected by the challenger, and achieve a lower vote share than him; relative
to not adopting it and participating in the election with voters perfectly learning his
underlying identity by the end of the first period. When conditions in the electorate are
such that the challenger would strictly prefer to reject the persistence of transfers, then
the incumbent would only allocate the whole budget for public goods provision if the
prior belief that he is competent is sufficiently high. Otherwise, he would rather propose
transfers to cultivate his vote among the mass of eligible voters.
Figure 2.7(b) depicts the conditions under which programmatic transfers can emerge:
the electoral competition must be among low competence candidates and the mass of
eligible citizens must be high enough. When this is the case, the incumbent would not take
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the risk of gambling on success whereas the challenger anticipates that, by disagreeing,
his support among ineligible voters would not high enough. But as the prior on the
challenger’s expected quality grows large enough, he would rather disagree —and, as
a result, the transfers policy put forward by the incumbent would achieve a status of
non-programmatic.


























(b) Equilibrium type of program
Note. The parameter values in the right panel are G(ỹ) = 35% which induces the threshold π̂C ≈ 0.32.
By endogenizing the agreement with the non-manipulability of a transfers policy, these
results suggest a political rationale for non-programmatic transfers to be widely observed
in different settings. From the challenger’s viewpoint, the first-period performance of
the incumbent can reveal him to be incompetent, in which case he would get an edge by
disagreeing with an electoral race of low stakes. That is, the challenger has incentives to
gamble on the incumbent’s failure and commit to public goods provision.
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2.6 Theoretical Implications for Empirical Models
This paper puts forward a simple idea: the very decision to implement programmatic
transfers is an equilibrium object. As such, observing the use of transfers should be
indicative that they also expected to advance their fortunes. The correct counterfactual
for when we see an action taken by an individual should be, therefore, what would have
happened had he not taken such action at all.
Treatment 1. Capacity to implement a programmatic transfers policy. What
it measures: The electoral effect of changing voters’ decision from what it would be when
an incumbent can implement a programmatic transfers policy, to what it would be when
he cannot implement it.
Suppose that we had perfect data from a country composed by N municipalities, with
N being very large. Suppose further that each municipality is identical: same incumbent
(e.g. a mayor), challenger, and mass of voters. For each municipality, everything remains
as in the main model. With each municipality being identical, the experimental ideal is
straightforward: randomize the treatment across the municipalities. Let D1 ∈ {1, 0} be
the treatment status indicator for some incumbent politician, specifying whether he can
(1) or cannot (0) employ transfers. Let the votes share received by an incumbent in some
municipality be F
(
b(θI − θC) | D1
)
. For each municipality, the potential outcomes are
F
(















After the randomization, all the incumbents in the treated municipalities would pursue
the objective of choosing a transfers policy that maximises their expected vote share
—while all incumbents in the control group would simply devote their budget to public
goods provision. With the number of municipalities being very large and with all politicians












θI − πC | 0
)]
p→ τ(0, b∗ | πI , πC)− τ(0, 1 | πI , πC) ≥ 0
Since we know that the equilibrium size of a transfers program is zero only in specific
circumstances and it is strictly positive otherwise, then the average treatment effect must
be weakly positive (δ ≥ 0). Intuitively, this stresses that a politician should be able to at
least weakly push in his favor having larger menu of feasible policy options for a budget
allocation.12
Although the experimental ideal that this paper puts forward may sound obvious
ex-post, it is not so ex-ante: the effect that the literature measures is different, rooted in
mechanisms such as feelings of reciprocity (Finan and Schechter 2012) or poorly informed
voters (Manacorda et al. 2011). Given the effects that they want to isolate, scholars
are rightly concerned with achieving one objective: creating balance in covariates among
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
12Indeed, this may be difficult to bring to the data. As such, it carries similar measurement problems
with other equilibrium objects. For instance, while there is a vast theoretical literature that studies
the effects of threats on political decisions (see Dal Bó and Di Tella, 2003; Wolton, 2020), this specific
strategy imposes a hard bound on what empirical scholars can do because threats are never materialized
in equilibrium.
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Treatment 2. Becoming a beneficiary of a programmatic transfers policy. What
it measures: The effect of changing voters’ electoral decision from what it would be if they
are the beneficiaries of a programmatic transfers policy, to what it would be if are not the
beneficiaries of a programmatic transfers policy, holding the transfers policy fixed.
Suppose that we take a mass of voters from some municipality, and we randomly
allocate each voter into one of two groups, G ∈ {0, 1}, which means that the distribution
of income and valence is the same in each. We now have two groups of voters with
perfect covariate balance. Let D2 ∈ {1, 0} be the treatment status indicator for a group,





—which emphasizes that the size of the transfers program is determined in





For each group, the potential outcomes are
F
(











b∗(θI − θC) | 0
)
if Control
It is then easy to see that, for whatever performance level, the average treatment effect
must be zero, independent of the experimental design and no matter how data is cut.
This null effect is, indeed, found by some scholars —further, Imai et al. (2020) re-assessed
a previous finding of positive effects in De La O (2012) and contended that, after data
correction, null effects also ensue. Based on this model, these null effects are reassuring
for the standard assumptions of voter rationality in the political economy literature.
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2.7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I uncover two mechanisms through which an incumbent politician can reap
electoral rewards through strategically allocating the budget across public goods and
programmatic transfers (in their idealized form). The first is an informativeness effect:
decreasing the size of transfers increases the amount of information that is revealed about
his identity. The second is an stakes effect: decreasing transfers increases the salience of
selecting competent politicians. From the incumbent’s viewpoint, these two effects go in
opposing directions.
When the incumbent is electorally ahead of his challenger, then the informativeness
effect is negative and the stakes effect is positive; and when he is electorally behind, then
the stakes effect is negative and the informativeness effect is positive. The equilibrium
transfers policy results from the optimal balance of these two effects: a leading incumbent
increases the stakes of the election at the cost of losing his reputation, whereas a trailing
incumbent decreases the stakes of the election at the cost of hindering his chances of
proving himself to the electorate.
Empirically, the model suggests that we should treat the very implementation of a
programmatic transfers program as an equilibrium object which, by its nature, should
yield weakly positive effects on the incumbent’s electoral fortunes. That is, this paper
stresses how the random allocation of transfer to voters, conditional on transfers being
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2.9 Appendix
2.9.1 Proof of Remark 1.
Proof. For simplicity, let X and Y be random variables with associated probability
density functions fX(x) and fY (y), respectively, both of which follow a standard uniform
distribution. Let S = X − Y . The probability density function of S, denoted by fS(s) is













1 if 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
0 otherwise
It is easy to see that fS(s) = 0 if either s ≤ −1 or if s ≥ 1 —which follows form
looking at the boundaries of the support of each random variable. We then focus at what
happens in between -1 to 1. We can further breakdown the problem to (i) −1 ≤ s ≤ 0
and (ii) 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. In both cases, for the integrand of equation (5) to be non-zero, we
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For part (i) we have that for the integrand to be non-zero, we need s+ y ≥ 0 which is









= 1 + s
That is, fS(s) = 1 + s for −1 ≤ s ≤ 0. For case (ii) we have that for the integrand to be










That is, fS(s) = 1− s for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. We have then that
fS(s) =

1 + s if − 1 ≤ s ≤ 0
1− s if 0 ≤ s ≤ 1
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We can then derive the continuous cumulative function by integrating, which results in (i)




















































which finalises the proof for the properties that the incumbent’s vote share satisfies.
Finally, it is easy to check that (6) is convex when −1 ≤ s ≤ 0 because its second
derivative strictly positive; whereas (7) is concave when 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 because its second
derivative is negative.
126
2.9.2 Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. By the distribution of the resulting valence shocks (or by inspection of Remark
1), we know that F (0) = 1/2. When the incumbent is leading, it must be the case that




> 1/2. This proves that the stakes effect
must be positive when the incumbent is leading. Even further, the stakes effect increases
as he allocates a higher budget to public goods. But when the incumbent is trailing, we




< 1/2. This proves that the stakes
effect must be negative when the incumbent is trailing. Similarly, increasing the budget
would only further this negative effect.
2.9.3 Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. Let p+1 = {p1 : p1 ≥ 1}, p−1 = {p1 : p1 ≤ b} and p∅1 = {p1 : b ≤ p1 ≤ 1}. Upon
observing a level of public goods provision in p1 ∈ p+1 , Bayesian updating yields
Pr
(










p1 ∈ p+1 |θI = 1
)
Pr(θI = 1) + Pr
(











p1 ∈ p+1 |θI = 1
)
Pr(θI = 1) + 0 Pr(θI = 0)
= 1
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The procedure is similar for the posterior induced by an outcome in p1 ∈ p−1 . Upon
observing an outcome in p1 ∈ p∅1 , Bayesian updating yields
Pr (θI = 1 | p1 ∈ p∅1 ) =
Pr (p1 ∈ p∅1 | θI = 1) Pr(θI = 1)
Pr (p1 ∈ p∅1 | θI = 1) Pr(θI = 1) + Pr (p1 ∈ p∅1 | θI = 0) Pr(θI = 0)
=
Pr (b+ η1 ≤ 1) πI
Pr (b+ η1 ≤ 1) πI + Pr (η1 ≥ b) (1− πI)
=
Pr (η1 ≤ 1− b) πI
Pr (η1 ≤ 1− b) πI + (1− Pr (η1 ≤ b)) (1− πI)
=
(1− b) πI
(1− b)πI + (1− b) (1− πI)
= πI
which completes the proof.
2.9.4 Proof of Lemma 3.
Proof. Recall first the definitions for the three set of outcomes to which a posterior belief
is associated: the set p+1 = {p1 : p1 ≥ 1} induces full learning that the incumbent is of
high ability; the set p−1 = {p1 : p1 ≤ b} that he is of low ability with certainty; and the set
p∅1 = {p1 : b ≤ p1 ≤ 1} leads to no learning. Given that the budget and the incumbent’s
type are complements in the production function, we have that
Pr(p1 ∈ p+1 ) = Pr(b θI + η1 ≥ 1)
= Pr(θI = 1) Pr(b+ η1 ≥ 1) + Pr(θI = 0) Pr(η1 ≥ 1)




Pr(p1 ∈ p−1 ) = Pr(b θI + η1 ≤ b)
= Pr(θI = 1) Pr(b+ η1 ≤ b) + Pr(θI = 0) Pr(η1 ≤ b)
= (1− πI) b
Finally, by the law of total probability, Pr(p1 ∈ p∅1 ) = 1−Pr(p1 ∈ p+1 )−Pr(p1 ∈ p−1 ) = 1−b,
which completes the proof.
2.9.5 Proof of Lemma 4.
Proof. This lemma follows from the incumbent’s vote share function is non-linear in the
space of voters’ posterior beliefs. I first provide a formal intuition and then I derive
explicit results. Notice by inspection of Remark 1, that when the challenger is almost
surely incompetent, then the incumbent’s vote share function is strictly concave along














for any πI ∈ (0, 1). That is, the informativeness effect must be negative: the incumbent
is better off playing it safe because his electoral distance with his challenger is considerable
enough. And when the challenger is almost surely competent, then the incumbent’s vote
share function is strictly convex. By Jensen’s inequality, we know that the inequality in
(8) simply reverses: the informativeness effect must be weakly positive, so the incumbent
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is better off gambling on success. Putting these two cases together, we formally derive
the results in Lemma 4 by applying the Intermediate Value Theorem: there must exist a
value on the prior belief on the incumbent, as a function of that of the challenger, which
determines the sign of the informativeness effect.
To derive explicit closed-form solutions, we have to look separately for the cases when
the prior of the challenger is below a half or above a half. A graphical intuition for this is
given in Figure 2.8 below.















Note. In both panels, the black line is the incumbent’s vote share absent learning, whereas the red
dashed line are the lottery over vote shares. Parameter values: πC = 4/10 (left panel); πC = 6/10 (right










































By inspection of Figure 8(a), whenever the challenger is weak (πC < 1/2), the right hand
side of (9) intersects the incumbent’s expected share of votes when beliefs are fixed and





+ b (1− πC)
(
















+ b (πI − πC)
(
1 +


















= (πI − πC)
(
1 +
b (πI − πC)
2
)
⇔ πI = 4πC − 2(πC)2 − 1 := πqI(πC)
where the last line follows after some algebra. And notice that πqI(πC) is strictly
increasing in πC because ∂π
q
I(πC)/∂πC = 4(1− πC), which is positive for any πC ∈ (0, 1).
Proceeding similarly, by inspection of Figure 2.8(b), whenever the challenger is strong
(πC > 1/2), the right hand side of (9) intersects the incumbent’s expected share of votes
















= (πI − πC)
(
1− b (πI − πC)
2
)
⇔ πI = 2 (πC)2 := πwI (πC)
from where it’s easy to see that πwI (πC) is increasing in πC ∈ (0, 1). We can then
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define, consistently with Lemma 4, the threshold value as
πaI (πI) =

4 πC − 2(πC)2 − 1 if πC < 1/2
2 (πC)
2 if πC ≥ 1/2
which completes the proof.
2.9.6 Statement and proof of Remark 2.
Remark 2. The total effect of allocating a positive budget for public goods provision can
be decomposed into an informativeness and a stakes effect.
Proof. The incumbent evaluates the impact that a transfers program has on his expected
utility. Therefore, we are looking at
τ(0, b |πI , πC) = E[uI |b]− E[uI |0]





























































2.9.7 Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. To find the optimal allocation for public goods, I look for first order conditions.
Notice that
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+ b (πI − πC)
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1− 3 b πC
)
2
− 1 + (1 + b(πI − πC))
2
2
+ (1− b)(πI − πC)
(




−3(1− πI) (πI − (πC)2)
2
)
− b(πI − πC)2 + (πI − πC) := ∆(b, πI , πC)
Consider the two following cases which are possible to verify by inspection:
lim
πI→1







∆(1, πI , πC) =
3πC(1− πC)(2πC − 1)
2




From (10) and (11) follows that when the incumbent allocates everything to public
goods and he is marginally leading against a challenger that is more likely than not to
be competent (πC > 1/2), then ∆(1, πI , πC) > 0 for any 1/2 < πC < πI < 1; otherwise
(πC < 1/2), then lim
πI→πC
∆(1, πI , πC) < 0.
By the Intermediate Value Theorem, it then follows that there must exist some
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π†(πC) ∈ [πC , 1/2) such that ∆(1, π†(πC), πC) = 0. And because we know that when the
prior on the challenger becomes high enough then the incumbent would rather allocate
everything to public goods, it must be the case that π†(πC) is decreasing in πC ∈ (0, πI).
Furthermore, it is easy to verify that ∆(0, πI , πC) = πI − πC > 0. We then have
the following results. First, if 1/2 < πC < πI < 1 or if 0 < πC < π
† < πI ≤ 1/2, then
∆(1, πI , πC) > 0 and the solution must therefore be a corner: the incumbent allocates
everything to public goods.
Second, if 0 < πC < πI < π
† ≤ 1/2, then ∆(1, πI , πC) < 0 and, by the Intermediate
Value Theorem, there must exist some b∗(πI) ∈ (0, 1) such that ∆(b∗(πI), πI , πC) = 0.
And since we know that as the prior on the incumbent grows large enough (πI > π
†) he
prefers to allocate everything to public goods, then it must be that b∗(πI) is increasing in












2(6b(1− πI)− 1) + 2πIπC − πI(πI + 3b(1− πI))
)
= 3bπC(1− πC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(2πC − 1) > 0⇔ πC >
1
2
This tells us that τ(0, b |πI , πC) is strictly convex in b when πC > 1/2, in which case the
solution must thereby be a corner: the incumbent allocates everything to public goods
whenever πC > 1/2. And a necessary condition for interior solutions is for πC < 1/2, as





b∗(πI) ∈ (0, 1) if 0 < πC < πI < π† < 1/2
1 if πI ≥ π†
We can recover a closed-form solution by setting ∆(b, πI , πC) = 0, which yields
b∗ =
−(πI − πC)2 +
√
(πI − πC) ((πI)3 − 3(πI)2(2 + πC) + πI (6 + 15(πC)2)− (πC)3 − 12(πC)2)
3(1− πI) (2(πC)2 − πI)
which is used for comparative statics of Figure 6(a). This completes the proof.
2.9.8 Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. To find the optimal allocation for public goods, I look for first order conditions.
Notice first that
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1− 3 b πC
)
2
− 1 + (1− b(πI − πC))
2
2
− (1− b)(πI − πC)
(








− b(πI − πC)2 + (πI − πC) := ∆̂(b, πI , πC)
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Proceeding similarly as before, it is possible to verify by inspection that
lim
πI→0
∆̂(1, πI , πC) = −πC(1− πC) < 0 (12)
lim
πI→πC
∆̂(1, πI , πC) =
3 πC (1− πI)(2πC − 1)
2




From (12) and (13) follows that when the incumbent allocates everything to public goods
and he is marginally trailing against a challenger that is more likely than not to be
incompetent (πC < 1/2), then ∆̂(1, πI , πC) < 0 for any 0 < πI < πC < 1/2; otherwise
(πC > 1/2), then lim
πI→πC
∆̂(1, πI , πC) > 0. By the Intermediate Value Theorem, it then
follows that there must exist some π‡ ∈ [1/2, πC) such that ∆̂(1, π‡, πC) = 0. For the
inverse reasons as above, because we know that when the prior on the challenger becomes
high enough and the incumbent’s trail is sufficiently narrow, then he would rather allocate
everything to public goods, it must be the case that π‡(πC) is increasing in πC ∈ (πI , 1).
Furthermore, it is easy to verify that ∆̂(0, πI , πC) = πI − πC < 0. We then have
the following results. First, if 0 < πI < πC < 1/2 or if 1/2 < πI < π
‡ < πC , then
∆̂(1, πI , πC) < 0 and the solution must therefore be a corner: the incumbent allocates
everything to transfers. Second, if 1/2 < π‡ < πI < πC , then ∆̂(1, πI , πC) > 0 and,
by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there must exist some b∗(πI) ∈ (0, 1) such that
∆̂(b∗(πI), πI , πC) = 0. And since we know that as the prior on the incumbent grows large
enough (πI > π
‡) he prefers to allocate everything to public goods, then it must be that












2πIπC(6 b− 1)− (πC)2(6bπI − 1) + πI(πI − 3b(1 + πI))
)
= 3πI (1− πC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(2πC − 1) > 0⇔ πC >
1
2
which is precisely the condition derived for b∗(πI). Therefore, this tells us that
τ(0, b |πI , πC) is strictly convex in b when πI > π‡. The solution must thereby be a corner:
the incumbent allocates everything to public goods whenever πI > π
‡.
Finally, we can pin down the value on πI such that the incumbent prefers to allocate
everything to public goods instead of everything to transfers by looking at



































from where it’s easy to see that that the first derivative is positive, which further confirms
that π‡(πC) is increasing in πC . This concludes the proof.
2.9.9 Proof of Lemma 5.
Proof. Suppose that the incumbent allocates a budget b ∈ R+ to public goods and
T(b) = 1− b to transfers. Let the challenger’s share of votes from disagreeing with the
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continuity of transfers, given some posterior belief µI about the incumbent, be defined as

































πC − b µI
))
We can write his difference in expected vote shares between agreeing and disagreeing
as ∆(b, 1) where the arguments imply that if he agrees then he upholds the allocation
b > 0 set by the incumbent, and if he disagrees he promises b = 1 if elected. Then,
∆(b, 1) = bπI
(








F (b(πI − πC))− α(πI , b)
)
Notice first that ∆(1, 1) = 0 trivially —because then there is no transfers policy to
























where the incumbent is strictly disadvantaged among the mass of eligible voters because
πC ∈ (0, 1) and G(ỹ) ∈ (0, 1) imply that πC < 1/G(ỹ). In addition, it is easy to check
that lim
πC→0
∆(0, 1) > 0 as the incumbent would only impose himself a loss of votes share
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> 0⇔ G(ỹ) > 1
2
From which follows (1) that when the incumbent is almost surely competent, then a
necessary condition for him to agree is for the mass of eligible voters to be the majority;
and (2) that if less than the majority is eligible to receive transfers, then lim
πC→0
∆(0, 1) > 0
and lim
πC→1
∆(0, 1) < 0 imply that there exists a threshold π1 ∈ (0, 1) on the prior on the
challenger such that ∆(0, 1 | πC = π1) = 0.
Finally, an additional implication is that if less than half of the population is eligible,
it must be the case that his share of votes among the eligible mass is zero since then it


































which is easy to see that is increasing in G(ỹ) – intuitively, it increases the cost of
disagreeing with the continuity of transfers.
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2.9.10 Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. Assume throughout this proof that G(ỹ) < 1/2. To start, consider the case when
πC < π̂C(G(ỹ)) so that the challenger would agree with the transfers program. We can
write the incumbent’s difference in expected vote shares between everything to transfers
and everything to public goods as











∆̂(πI , πC) =
1
2
− F (−πC) > 0
lim
πI→1
∆̂(πI , πC) =
1
2
− F (1− πC) < 0
where the first part follows because we know that F (−πC) < 1/2 for any positive
πC —when the incumbent is almost surely incompetent, then his expected vote share
by allocating everything to public goods is less than a half. And where the second part
follows because we know that F (1− πC) > 12 for any πC < 1.
By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there must exist some π̂ ∈ (0, 1) such that


















+ πC > 0
⇔ πI <
πC(2− πC)
1 + 2πC(1− πC)
:= π̂(πC)
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π2C − πC + 1
)(
1 + 2 πC (1− πC)
)2 < 0
↔ π2C − πC + 1 < 0
which cannot be true because πC ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the threshold must be increasing in πC .
Consider now the case where πC > π̂C(G(ỹ)), so that the challenger would disagree
with the transfers program. We can write the incumbent’s difference in expected vote
shares between everything to transfers and everything to public goods as




























Naturally, being it almost certain that he is incompetent, he would rather cultivate
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∆̂(πI , πC) =
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∆̂(πI , πC) =
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where the second case follows from the discussion of Lemma 5. Since lim
πI→0
∆̂(πI , πC) > 0
and lim
πI→0
∆̂(πI , πC) < 0, by the Intermediate Value Theorem we know that there must
exist some π̂I(πC) such that ∆̂(π̂I , πC) = 0. We can recover closed-form solutions by
examining













































2 − 2πC − 1
)
2 (πC)2 − 2 πC − 1
:= π̂I(πC)
which is naturally increasing in πC —as the rewards from proving to be competent




1 + 2πC(1− πC)




2 − 2 πC − 1
)
2 (πC)2 − 2 πC − 1
if πC > π̂C(G(ỹ))
which completes the proof —while it stresses the additional insight that when the
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incumbent expects his challenger to disagree, the threshold is also increasing in G(ỹ), as
it increases his support among the mass of eligible voters.
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3 Brains or Muscles? A Political Economy of Tax Evasion
Chapter 3
Brains or Muscles?
A Political Economy of Tax Evasion
Abstract
A wealthy citizen wants to get away with tax evasion, a risky practice that can trigger
audits resulting in sanctions. To reduce the chances of being audited, he can invest in
the complexity of his evasion scheme —which we call “brains”. The probability that an
audit results in a sanction depends on the effort exerted by an investigator. To reduce the
effort that she exerts, the citizen can commit to delivering punishments —which we call
“muscles”. We show that there exists a threshold in the quality of institutions below which
muscles and brains are complements and above which they are substitutes. The citizen’s
equilibrium strategies yield a testable prediction: estimates of offshore tax evasion display
an inverted U-shape along the quality of institutions. We provide evidence of this finding
by building a panel dataset of estimated offshore wealth by individuals for 37 countries
between 2002 to 2016.
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3.1 Introduction
Tax evasion remains a persistent political and economic problem, despite the actions
of countries and international organizations to fight against those who actively seek to
neglect their taxation responsibilities. Among the several tactics used to evade taxes,
evidence shows that global offshore wealth has substantially increased in the last forty
years, as its magnitude added up to USD 190 billion in 2014 (Zucman 2015). Clearly,
the missing tax revenue is to the detriment of the rest of the population. Furthermore,
Alstadsaeter, Johannesen and Zucman (2019) show that almost its entirety comes from
the citizens at the very top of the wealth distribution. How are these wealthy citizens
able to get away with it?
This paper attempts to shed new lights on this question by bridging two theoretical
literatures: one concerned with how tax evaders can manipulate the probability of being
caught (see Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002), and one which studies the distortions in the
actions of a public official caused by the very capacity of some pressure groups to deliver
punishments (see Dal Bó 2006). This connection matters in practice as demonstrated by
the negative consequences that some journalists suffered after the publication of “The
Panama Papers”, a complex tax evasion scandal uncovered by a team of 107 media
organizations in over 80 countries, resulting in USD 1.3 billion recovered by tax authorities
(McGoey 2021).
For instance, one disturbing retaliation was against the Maltese journalist Daphne
Caruana Galizia, who was assassinated on October 16, 2017, with a bomb planted in her
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car (Pace 2017).13 In addition to being involved in bringing “The Panama Papers” into
light, in the months prior to her assassination she was also digging into Malta’s “Golden
Visas”, a citizenship-by-investment program that she suspected was rife with bribery and
kickbacks as it was attractive to tax evaders worldwide (Giles 2019). One of the main
suspects for her homicide is one of Malta’s most important businessman, who was deeply
involved in the former evasion scandal, was apprehended while allegedly trying to flee
Malta in his private yacht (Wesel 2019).
Indeed, these negative consequences of exposing tax evaders are not only suffered
by investigative journalists. There exists evidence that official tax inspectors can also
experience costs from bringing them to justice. For example, Finckenauer and Voronin
(2001, 22) have argued that “blackmail, threats, violence, and corruption involving tax
inspectors and the tax police are commonplace throughout Russian” by the hand of
criminal organizations that operate in partnership with businessmen.
To make sense of how these two strategies interact, we study a stylised model where a
wealthy and influential citizen can take actions to avoid being audited and sanctioned
in his evasion of taxes. In our framework, the stronger the fiscal institutions in place,
the better the tax enforcement capacity and, thereby, the higher the chances that a tax
evader gets audited. To reduce the likelihood of being investigated, we assume that the
citizen can invest in the complexity of his evasion scheme, which can include tactics such
as having his taxable wealth hidden offshore. We refer to this type of strategy as “brains”
—which we can further think of as a concealment technology as in Cremer and Gahvari




In addition, we assume that an audit does not directly lead to an indictment. Con-
ditional on an audit being triggered, sanctions only accrue if an investigator (who can
be a journalist or a public official) finds hard evidence about the citizen’s attempted
tax evasion. The probability that an investigator finds hard evidence depends on the
effort that she chooses to exert. In order to reduce her effort, the citizen can commit to
delivering a punishment, such as legal harassment or smear campaigns. We refer to this
type of strategy as “muscles”.15 As in Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Di Tella (2006), we assume that
the harm induced by some level of punishment depends on the institutional protections
surrounding the investigator: the better the legal institutions in place, the lower the harm
that retaliations would impose against the investigator.
By allowing the citizen to engage in both types of strategies, our model produces a
key comparative static that we then take to the data: estimates of tax evasion through
offshoring wealth display an inverted U-shape along the quality of institutions of a country.
The key driver for this result are the non-monotonic marginal returns to the citizen’s
investment in muscles. When there is a poor quality of institutions, the citizen finds
it optimal to increasingly invest in muscles as the harm that these would impose on
the investigator is high. But as institutions become better, the effectiveness of muscles
decrease for the reason that there are improved protections surrounding the investigator
14In Cremer and Gahvari (1994), the investment in a “concealment technology” could also include
bribery of the tax police. Because we are, unlike them, introducing an investigator that has a role only
after an audit is triggered, we think of this technology purely in terms of the complexity in the evasion
scheme.
15As extensively argued by Dal Bó and Di Tella (2003, 1124-1125), pressure groups “have a whole
range of actions available to them that lie between giving them money and killing them”, which often
includes “accusations related to some real or fictitious crimes” or simply “a costly legal harassment”.
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—and the citizen would rather make his evasion scheme increasingly complex to avoid
being audited in the first place.
In order to bring these theoretical insight to the data, we building a panel dataset of
estimated offshore wealth by individuals for 37 countries between 2002 to 2016, and an
index of rule of law that proxies for the enforcement of contracts, property rights, the police
and the courts. As we argue later, we believe this dependent variable to be appropriate
because of the way in which we conceptually think about the citizen’s investment in brains.
We show that the predicted relationship is robust to different empirical specifications and
a battery of controls.
As such, this paper also contributes to the literature that investigates the determinants
of tax evasion, which include tax morale (Dell’Anno 2001), tax burden and corruption
(Torgler 2005) and the effects of institutional quality in the shadow economy (Torgler
and Schneider 2009). And, perhaps more importantly, it contributes to the literature
concerned with the determinants of international tax evasion, which has previously found
that higher tax burden is positively associated with evasion via tax havens (Kemme,
Parikh and Steigner 2017).
3.2 The Workhorse Model
We study a three-stage game between a citizen (E) and an investigator (I).16 The citizen
can evade a unit of money which is taxable at a rate τ ∈ (0, 1). Evasion is a risky practice
16We think rather broadly about investigator; that is, conceptually it can be an official tax inspector
or an investigative journalist. We reserve the pronouns “he” for the citizen, “she” for the investigator.
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in that it may trigger an investigation (or an audit) that results in sanctions. We assume
that the citizen’s action space with respect to evasion is discrete, h ∈ {0, 1}, each standing
for evading nothing and everything, respectively. This discrete action space is adopted for
simplicity. As we argue in a later section, our core results continue to hold if we allow the
citizen to choose how much to evade.
The probability that an audit against the citizen is triggered depends on his decision
to evade, on the complexity of his evasion scheme, and on the quality of institutions.
Formally, let a ∈ {0, 1} be the event space that capture whether an investigation happens





= λ× (1− b)× h
where λ ∈ (0, 1) represents the quality of institutions, and where b ∈ [0, 1] represents
the citizen’s investment in the complexity of the evasion scheme, with low values capturing
a poor evasion scheme, such as dealing in cash and not giving receipts, and high values
capturing complex schemes such as offshoring wealth. We refer to b as investment in
“brains”. While the quality of institutions is exogenous, the citizen’s investment in brains
is endogenously chosen.
An investigation about tax evasion does not directly lead to a sanction. This only
happens if the investigator is able to find hard evidence. By exerting effort e ∈ [0, 1], the
inspector gets a message σ ∈ {0, 1}, each standing for hard evidence not being found
(σ = 0) and found (σ = 1). The probability of finding hard evidence is given by
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Pr(σ = 1) = e
Hard evidence leads directly to the citizen being sanctioned. As in the canonical
formulation of Alligham and Sandmo (1972), after an indictment the citizen would have
to pay his due taxes at a penalty rate θ ∈ (τ, 1). To deter the investigator from exerting
effort, the citizen can also invest in “muscles”, m ∈ [0, 1], as a form of punishment in the
event of a sanction. The cost that muscles impose on the investigator depends on the
institutions in place to protect her, which is given by




which captures that the better the quality of institutions, the lower the harm that
some level of punishment would impose on the investigator.
The citizen’s payoff depends on his evasion choice and on his investment in brains and
muscles, which we can write as follows
























The game proceeds as follows:
Stage 1. The citizen chooses whether to evade or not, as well as his investment in
brains and muscles.
Stage 2. Nature determines whether the citizen’s behaviour triggers suspicion
of tax evasion. If no suspicions arise, then the citizen is not indicted, payoffs are
realized and the game ends; otherwise, the game moves to the next stage.
Stage 3. The investigator exerts effort to find hard evidence about the citizen’s tax
evasion. If hard evidence is found, then the citizen is indicted, payoffs are realized
and the game ends; otherwise, no indictment happens, payoffs are realized and the
game ends.
The structure of the game is common knowledge. The solution concept employed
is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. In a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, (i) the
investigator optimally chooses her effort in searching for hard evidence, given the citizen’s
investment in muscles; and (ii) the citizen optimally makes his choices of evasion and
investment in brains and muscles, in anticipation of the investigator’s equilibrium effort
and the exogenous probability of being investigated.
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3.2.1 Comments on the model
There are three points worth stressing. The first is that it is possible to conceptually
distinguish between the role of institutions with respect to detection of the citizen’s tax
evasion and the protections surrounding the investigator. As in Besley and Persson (2011),
we could think of the former as the state fiscal capacity to administer, monitor and enforce
taxation, and about the latter as the state legal capacity to “provide regulation and legal
services such as the protection of property rights or the enforcement of contracts” (6). In
our modelling choices, however, we are assuming that these two capabilities are strongly
correlated. As extensively argued by Besley and Persson (2011), fiscal and legal capacity
tend to be complements since “investments in one aspect of the state reinforce the motives
to invest in the other” (15).
The second regards a possible correlation between the tax and the penalty rate with
the quality of institutions; that is, it may well be the case that both corr(λ, τ) > 0 and
corr(λ, θ) > 0. For instance, this could happen if better (worse) institutions are more (less)
responsive to the interests of the population. Our main model assumes that these rates
are flat in order to avoid complications with respect to the particulars of such correlations.
Nevertheless, we show in the Appendix that this choice does not affect any of the core
results.
Finally, we want to stress that the discretization of the citizen’s tax evasion space is
an artifact that allows us to bring to the front the brains and muscles mechanisms, while
still giving the citizen the choice to evade or not. Were the size of evasion continuous, the
model would capture Yitzhaki’s (1987) extension of the canonical paper of Allingham and
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Sandmo (1972) as it would imply an endogenisation of the probability of being audited
through the amount of tax evaded. As we mentioned earlier, we allow for this possibility
as an extension in the Appendix and show through simulations that our core results
persist.
3.2.2 Analysis
First, note that if the citizen chooses not to evade, then there would be no gains from
investing in brains or muscles and his expected utility would simply be equal to (1− τ).
But if he chooses to evade, then he needs to optimally decide how much to invest in brains
and muscles, in anticipation of the chances of being audited and the investigator’s effort
to uncover hard evidence.
In the event of an audit, the effort that the investigator would exert is directly affected
by the punishment that indicting the citizen would induce. Formally, she chooses










It is straightforward to see that, given some level of muscles m ∈ [0, 1], her effort is
increasing in the quality of institutions (λ ∈ (0, 1)) because this attenuates the harm it
would impose; and, given some quality of institutions, her effort is decreasing in muscles.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the citizen engages in tax evasion (h = 1). Then, there exists a
unique threshold λ†(θ) ∈ (0, 1), decreasing in θ ∈ (0, 1), such that the following holds on
the equilibrium path:
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To understand the insights from Lemma 1, suppose that the quality of institutions is
very low. Then, from the citizen’s viewpoint the direction of the effects of brains or muscles
investments coincides. Since a low quality of institutions imply an already low chance
that an investigation is triggered, investing in brains could further push this probability
down. At the same time, it also implies that institutional protections surrounding the
investigator are deficient: in the unlikely case that an investigation happens, investing in
muscles could be an effective deterrent for the investigator’s incentives to exert effort.




















Note. The black (gray) line graphs the optimal investment in brains (muscles), with θ = 1/2 which
induces the threshold λ†(θ) ≈ 0.42.
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Given that the investments in brains and muscles are convexly costly, the citizen finds
it optimal to balance his expenditures across both strategies. As depicted in Figure 1,
below some threshold in the quality of institutions, brains and muscles are complements
to the citizen.
But as the quality of institutions grows large enough, the increasing institutional
protections surrounding the investigator make an investment in muscles progressively
ineffective; that is, the returns from this strategy become a poor deterrent to the inves-
tigator’s incentive to exert effort to uncover hard evidence. In turn, the citizen would
rather place his coins in not having an investigation being triggered in the first place: this
is, to him, the safest way to avoid being sanctioned from his evasion of taxes. As shown in
Figure 1, above some threshold in the quality of institutions, brains and muscles thereby
become substitutes to the citizen.
Another insight in Lemma 1 is the effect that an increase in the penalty rate has on the
before-mentioned threshold: it increases the range of values for which brains progressively
offsets muscles. Indeed, a higher penalty rate pushes the citizen towards the safer strategy
of avoiding to be audited in the first place, relative to the alternative of increasing muscles
to reduce the chances that the investigator uncovers hard evidence even if he is audited.
But this is not the only effect that results after an increase in the penalty rate.
Lemma 2. If the citizen engages in tax evasion (h = 1), then for any τ < θa < θb < 1,
the following inequalities hold: b∗(λ, θb) > b∗(λ, θa) and m∗(λ, θb) > m∗(λ, θa).
The above lemma tells us that an increase in the sanction following an indictment
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also increases the incentives for the citizen to invest a higher amount both on brains
and muscles. This would further reduce the risk of engaging in evasion. This implies
that although there is a quicker substitution between brains and muscles, the intensity
of the punishment directed towards the investigator would hike. As we can expect, the
effects that follow an increase in the penalty rate should decrease overall the incentives of
engaging in tax evasion altogether because it becomes both riskier and more expensive.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique threshold λ‡(θ) ∈ (0, 1), decreasing in θ ∈ (τ, 1),
such that the following holds on the equilibrium path:
(a) If λ ≤ λ‡(θ), then the citizen engages in tax evasion (h = 1) and invests b∗(λ, θ) > 0
in brains and m∗(λ, θ) > 0 in muscles.
(b) If λ > λ‡(θ), then the citizen does not engage in tax evasion (h = 0) and invests
nothing in brains and muscles.
With these theoretical insights, we can pose the following question: What do we
estimate when we try to estimate tax evasion by the wealthy? In our framework, this
is a mixture of two key quantities: the success of the state fiscal capacity in detecting
possible tax evasion, despite a citizen’s investment in the complexity of his evasion scheme;
and the failure of the state legal capacity to provide enough protections to investigators
(journalists, tax police, etc) to counteract a citizen’s retaliation investments.
To understand this, we can start by examining the effect that the citizen’s investment in
muscles has on the effort that the investigator exerts. As illustrated in Figure 1, whenever
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the quality of institutions is not too high (λ ≤ λ†(θ)), expenditures on punishment are
increasing along this measure which have a starting point at zero (with no retaliation). In
turn, this implies that the effort exerted by the investigator starts at a high value since
she expects a negligible punishment (because limλ→0m
∗(λ, θ) = 0) and strictly decreases
thereafter as institutions become better (because limλ→λ†(θ) m
∗(λ, θ) > 0).
By a similar reasoning, when the institutional quality becomes high enough (λ > λ†(θ)),
the strict decrease on the expenditures on retaliation along such variable (recall that it is
substituted by a higher investment in brains) entails an increase in the effort that the
investigator chooses to utilize (because limλ→1m
∗(λ, θ) = 0). Put equivalently, the non-
monotonic (U-shaped) equilibrium investments in muscles gives rise to a non-monotonic
(inverted U-shaped) equilibrium effort by the investigator.























Note. On the right panel, the highest estimated tax evasion is given by E ≈ 0.014; and the tax and
penalty rates are τ = 2/10 and θ = 3/10, which induce λ‡(θ) ≈ 0.75.
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The implication of the investigator’s equilibrium effort is that her probability of
successfully uncovering evidence of tax evasion will be at its lowest at intermediate levels
of the quality of institutions, precisely because the institutional protections that surround
her do not sufficiently attenuate the citizen’s retaliation in the event of an indictment.
But the investigator does not always examine unlawful behaviour by the citizen; she only
investigates those that are detected, which is affected by the citizen’s optimal investment
in brains. Put differently, from an ex-ante standpoint a proportion of tax evasion attempts
would go unnoticed, which would downwardly bias the true evasion endeavour of a citizen.
As illustrated in the right panel of Figure 2, the interaction of these two aspects (the
proportion of detected cases and the proportion of investigated cases for which hard
evidence is not uncovered) yields a theoretical expectation that we can take to the data:
estimated tax evasion displays an inverted U-shape along the quality of institutions. This
prediction comes with the caveat that it holds as long as the difference between the tax
and penalty rate is not too high.
Remark 1. If τ > 1/2, or if τ ≤ 1/2 and θ ∈ (τ, 1−
√
1− 2 τ), then λ†(θ) < λ‡(θ).
Remark 1 gives sufficient (and not necessary) conditions for the estimates of tax evasion
to display the aforementioned shape, which are illustrated in the right panel of Figure 2.
Although these conditions are sufficient, it is easy to see that the expected relationship
holds for a wide range of values. If we were to examine necessary conditions, the set
of values for which the relationship holds grows larger. For instance, for a tax rate of
13%, Remark 1 states that it is sufficient for the penalty rate to be lower than 14% for
the relationship to hold. However, as we show in the Appendix, a back of the envelope
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calculation shows that the inverted U-shape holds for any penalty rate lower than 31%.
Finally, note that because of the way in which we conceptualise an investment in
brains, we can substantively think of these estimates in terms of offshore tax evasion for
the reason that, by Lemma 1, the complexity of the evasion scheme is strictly increasing
along the quality of institutions.
3.3 The Data
To bring the theoretical prediction to the data, our key dependent variable utilises estimates
of offshore wealth in international financial centers by individuals for 37 countries between
2002 and 2016, computed by the European Commission (2019).17 To the best of our
knowledge, this study contains the most recent and comprehensive estimates of offshore tax
evasion that can be found in the literature.18 To the extent that the applied computational
method does not account for life insurance contracts, cash money and real estates, as well
as not capturing the growing practice of dual fiscal residency, these should be thought as
lower bound estimates.19
The time period for our empirical analysis merits a further note. While many attempts
have been made to reduce the importance of tax heavens, especially during the financial
crisis started in 2008, the results of these endeavours have not been substantial as to pose
17For the list of countries included in the analysis, see the Appendix. In the choice of estimates of tax
evasion, we maximize the number of country-year observations.
18In order to calculate these estimates, the document by the European Commission (2019) employs a
method first developed by Zucman (2013), which hinges on the global discrepancy between international
portfolio assets and liabilities. The particulars of this method, based on macroeconomic statistics, make
it very unlikely that a measurement error would be heterogeneous across countries. The EU document
also contains alternative, though less comprehensive, estimates (Table 3.1).
19As argued in the European Commission document, strategies to evade taxes through offshoring
usually involve the creation of anonymous shell companies in countries with lax regulations.
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threats to our analysis. Indeed, as Johannensen and Zucman (2014) shows, the main
effect of the bilateral treaties between G20 countries and tax havens have been that tax
evaders have shifted to countries that were not covered by these agreements. Given that
these estimates regard all international financial centers, we do not think that the recent
efforts by governments consistently diminish the relevance of our empirical specification,
beyond the inclusion of year fixed effects.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Tax Evasion 555 3.28 1.66 0.63 7.26
Rule of Law 555 1.05 0.30 0.08 1.38
Top Tax Rate 555 0.32 0.09 0.10 0.49
Top 1% Income 535 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.23
Stability 555 1.12 0.24 0.21 1.41
GDP 555 12.96 1.77 9.22 16.66
Inflation 555 2.06 0.30 1.40 3.01
Wealth 409 2.30 0.96 0 4.46
Press Freedom 235 33.92 1.42 29.99 36.63
Note. All variables are log-normalized and winsorized at the 1% to account for outliers.
The key explanatory variable to proxy for the quality of institutions comes from the
rule of law index found in World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. This index
measures the “perceptions on the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights,
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann,
Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010, 4). Methodologically, it is a standardized latent measure based
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on a model of thirty-two variables related to the rule of law.20
In Table 3.1, we list all the variables to be utilized in the empirical analysis. Among
these, we include a set of controls that could arguably be associated with individuals’
incentives to engage in offshoring their taxable wealth. The variable Top Tax Rate,
constructed mainly from the Comparative Income Taxation Database (Genovese, Scheve
and Stasavage 2016), measures the highest marginal tax rate for individuals. This could
capture incentives for the wealthiest citizens to evade more as the tax rate increase (see
Torgler 2005).
We would also like to take into account the empirical evidence about the strong
association between wealth inequality and tax evasion (Alstadsaeter, Johannesen and
Zucman 2019). Unfortunately, reliable estimates of wealth inequality exist only for a
handful of countries. To partially account for this, we include the variable Top 1% Income,
which comes from the World Income Inequality Database and which measures the share
of the top one percent of the income distribution.21
In addition, since it is also likely that evasion incentives arise from uncertainty concerns
regarding regime changes from popular uprisings, we include the variable Stability which
is an index found in the The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, and it
20Although there exists some criticism surrounding this index, Versteeg and Ginsburg (2017) show that
it is highly correlated with alternative measures. As they write, “indicators created by the [Worldwide
Governance Indicators], the Heritage Foundation, and the [World Justice Project] are almost identical,
with their pair-wise correlations all exceeding 0.95” (102). Our preference towards the Worldwide
Governance Indicators is due to data availability and methodological reasons. On the former, data from
the World Justice Project is available only since 2012 and it is comparable across years since 2015; and,
on the latter, the Heritage Foundation’s index heavily relies on assessments by country experts.
21In the Appendix, we also conduct the empirical analysis using estimates of total net private from
the World Income Inequality Database. We do not include it in our main analysis for two reasons. First,
because it is only available for a smaller number of countries relative to the variable Top 1% Income.
And, second, it is very highly correlated with GDP.
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measures the “perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence
and terrorism.” Controlling for this variable would further avoid to confound the effect
of our measure of rule of law with one specifically related to threats to the political
stability of the country, since these threats do not play a clear role in the brains-muscles
mechanisms highlighted in our theoretical model.22
Finally, we would also want to account for the effects that the economic characteristics
of a country may have on our dependent variable. As shown by some scholars (Crane and
Nourzad 1986; Caballé and Panadés 2004), there is a positive association between the
inflation rate and aggregate evasion. Our variable Inflation, which comes from the OECD
database, accounts for this. Using data from The World Bank’s Worldwide Development
Indicators, we also include Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Certainly, the choice of control variables is constrained by data limitations of countries
with poor or medium institution quality, for which is more difficult to find reliable
statistics. Given this constraint, we believe that we control for the most important
alternative channels. As such, we interpret the rule of law variable as an umbrella measure
that captures impartiality and non-arbitrariness of institutions, including tax institutions.
22An additional institutional variable which can affect incentives to evade is the freedom of press. We
do not include it in our main analysis because of data availability limitations. Nonetheless, we include
in the Appendix results with a measure of Press Freedom, which comes from the World Press Freedom
Index compiled by Reporters Without Borders.
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3.3.1 Empirical Analysis
In order to test the prediction of the theoretical model previously outlined, our main
empirical specification is an ordinary least squares (henceforth, “OLS”) panel specification
with country and year fixed effects. Indeed, the inclusion of country fixed effects is crucial
given the potential role of long-run factors that create favorable conditions for evasion
in some countries (but perhaps not in others) many decades before the period of the
study. The inclusion of year fixed effects instead captures common trends across panels,
potentially related to international efforts to combat tax evasion. With a slight abuse of
notation in the vector of controls, our empirical specification is
ln(Yj,t) = αj + βt + γ ln(Rule of Lawj,t) + δ ln(Rule of Lawj,t)
2 + η ln(Xj,t) + εj,t,
where for each country j at year t, Yj,t is the amount of offshore wealth; αt is the set of
country fixed effects; βt is the set of year fixed effects; Rule of Lawj,t is the value of Rule
of Law; Xj,t is the vector of controls specified in Table 3.1; and εj,t is the error term.
Our theoretical expectation is for the coefficient γ to be positive and the coefficient δ
to be negative, as it would imply an inverted-U shape of our dependent variable along our
measure of institutional quality. The main regression results are shown in Table 3.2. In
the first column, we start by regressing our dependent variable on the rule of law measure
and its squared value. We observe that the relationship confirmed our expectations, both
in direction and in statistical significance.23
23For all the specifications of Table 3.2, note that the marginal effect of our explanatory variable on our
dependent one will be equal to ∂ ln(Y )/∂ ln(Rule of Law) = γ + 2 δ ln(Rule of Law), where we dropped
the subscripts for simplicity. This implies two things. First, that the effect of a percentage change of
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Table 3.2: Panel regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rule of Law 6.08*** 3.51* 6.06*** 6.03*** 5.92*** 6.13*** 3.52**
(1.90) (1.83) (1.90) (1.96) (1.88) (1.96) (1.77)
Rule of Law2 -3.00*** -2.03** -3.00*** -2.97*** -2.98*** -3.02*** -2.01**







Top Tax Rate -1.35** -0.57
(0.69) (0.72)
Top 1% Income 0.99 0.47
(1.78) (1.59)
Fixed Effects X X X X X X X
Observations 555 555 555 555 555 555 555
R2 (within) 0.48 0.55 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.56
Note. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Moreover, columns 2 to 6 include other time-varying controls one by one, as we have
reasonable theoretical reasons to believe they may influence our dependent variable in a
country. Across these columns, only GDP and Top Tax Rate (the highest marginal tax
rate) display explanatory power.24 Column 7 shows our preferred empirical specification,
our rule of law measure on offshore evasion will depend on its starting value. Additionally, it implies
that the effect of a percentage change in our explanatory variable on offshore evasion can have a positive
or a negative direction: when the rule of law measure is lower than 0.8756, the effect would be positive;
and when it is higher than such value, the effect would be negative. In effect, this is simply a solution
to ∂ ln(Y )/∂ ln(Rule of Law) = 0. One standard deviation above this value of the main independent
variable would lead to a 18 percent decrease in tax evasion and one standard deviation; one standard
deviation below
24As shown in the Appendix, including the squared value of GDP so as to resemble the rule of law
variable, does not affect any results.
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including all controls. It is interesting to note that in this case only GDP remains
statistically significant. More importantly, across all these alternative specifications the
relationship between rule of law and tax evasion is aligned with our theoretical expectations
and remains statistically significant.25
As explained above, the specification exploits within country variation in the rule of
law. This choice might raise some concerns related to a potential effect capturing not
substantial variation in the main variables. We first address these concerns graphically;
Figure 3.4 and 3.5 in the Appendix show that the variation within countries for tax evasion
and rule of law index is surely not negligible. Then, we perform the test proposed in
Aronow and Samii (2015) to understand the heterogeneity of the results in a traditional
“average-effect” OLS model. We find that the effective sample for which the effect of rule
of law on tax evasion is not negligible, and it is not much different from the nominal
sample of 37 countries.
More precisely, only 11 countries have small or trivial weights in the contribution to
the average effect (with mean weight per country equal to 0.027 and median weight 0.016).
Interestingly, the top 6 contributing countries, with values more than twice the mean
weight, are Hungary, Brazil, India, Greece, Croatia and Malta. As a minor point, the
inclusion of time and country fixed effects do not change much neither the significance
nor the magnitude of the coefficients (see Table 3.5 in the Appendix). We interpret this
as a further indication that the within country variation is sufficient to deliver accurate
estimates.
25Table 3.4 in the Appendix replicates the same strategy by including (one at a time) a measure of
press freedom and a proxy of private net wealth, and we show that results continue to hold —although,
as mentioned before, including this variables reduces the sample size due to data availability.
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Additionally, it can be difficult to substantively interpret what a smooth continuous
increase (or decrease) of our rule of law measure exactly entails. As explained in a previous
section, this is due to this index being a standardized latent measure based on a model
of thirty-two variables. As such, a within country unit change in this variable could be
caused by a number of different factors that may not sufficiently capture our theorized
mechanisms.
Figure 3.3: Deciles of Rule of Law on Tax Evasion
We address this concern by breaking up this continuous measure into deciles, for the
reason that an across-decile movement is likely to require an overall change in a large
number of the variables that comprise this index. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, when
replicating the full model with this new approach, the theorized inverted-U shape persists.
25More precisely, we calculate the deciles according to the in-sample distribution of the index of rule of
law, and we carry out the same exercise for our Stability control variable. The corresponding regression
table can be found in Table 3.6 of the Appendix.
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3.3.2 Robustness Checks
To study the robustness of our previous results, we first consider alternative correlational
structures of standard errors. In order to check for the possibility of autocorrelation of
the errors, we employ a Prais-Winsten estimation to allow for first-order autocorrelation
coefficients for each country. The results, shown in the second column of Table 3.3, further
confirms our findings. As a comparison, the first column displays our earlier results for
the full model.
Table 3.3: Robustness results
(OLS) (Prais-Winsten) (Blundell-Bond)
Rule of Law 3.52∗∗ 1.64∗ 2.48∗
(1.77) (0.89) (1.49)




Fixed Effects X X X
Controls X X X
Observations 555 555 518
Note. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The second robustness check contemplates a potential persistent nature of tax evasion.
Put differently, our preferred earlier specification assumes that the drivers of our dependent
variable, which are omitted in the error term, are not correlated with past and future
measures of rule of law. This assumption may be violated if, for example, present evasion
affects future evasion via an increase in the institutional efforts to fight it, or via legal
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reforms. To attend this possibility, we employ a system Generalized Method of Moments
to account for a dynamic structure of the panel data. More specifically, we use the
estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), which includes lagged differences of
the dependent variable as instruments for the level equation.
As shown in the third column of Table 3.3, our main findings do not qualitatively
change with the inclusion of the lagged evasion variable. It is also important to note that
past evasion has a strongly significant positive effect on present evasion, confirming the
hypothesized persistent nature of evasion patterns. Overall, Table 3.3 shows that our
results are robust to alternative empirical specifications.
We make use of alternative estimates of tax evasion by the IMF in order to increase the
number of countries. This data is available only for 2016. The corresponding regression
in Table 3.7 confirms the U-shaped relationship between amount of evasion and rule of
law index, even if significance disappears when all controls are included. For year 2016,
World Justice Network provides estimates of rule of law for almost two hundred countries.
We then use them as an alternative main independent variable, instead of the World
Bank ones, and shows that the results are unaffected. Overall, these empirical exercises
demonstrate that the theoretical prediction is supported by any available estimates of
dependent and main explanatory variable. 26
Finally, we acknowledge that evasion methods could potentially spillover across coun-
tries. This practice could potentially bias the results. To account for this, we substitute
26We are not concerned about the loss of significance for these regressions with all controls, given the
substantially smaller sample and the above-mentioned problem of data availability for countries with
poor and medium level of quality of institutions.
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regional fixed effects for country fixed effects in our preferred regression.27 Table 3.4 in the
Appendix shows that the coefficients are even more precisely defined in this alternative
specification.
Lastly, we recognize that the destination countries of offshore wealth are international
financial centers (for a complete list, see European Commission 2019). As such, being at
the receiving end might influence the incentives of a country’s fight against tax evasion
in complex fashions, potentially having an effect on the amount of evasion of its citizens.
For this reason, we run the entire analysis excluding Luxembourg, the only country being
a financial center in the sample, and find that our results remain unaffected.
3.4 Conclusion
The negative consequences against some investigative journalists involved in the pub-
lication of “The Panama Papers” have shown that exposing tax evaders may be risky
for investigators. In turn, these potential costs affects the incentives of investigators in
the search for evidence of wrongdoing. This calls for new ways of theorizing about tax
evasion tactics. To do so, we develop a stylised model where wealthy and influential
citizens can affect their chances of being caught and sanctioned by investing in brain (the
complexity of the their evasion scheme) and muscles (punishments against investigators).
We then obtain a key theoretical insight that we take to the data: estimates of offshore
tax evasion display an inverted U-shape along the quality of institution. The empirical
test of this model relies on country estimates of the aggregate amount of offshore tax
27Given the data available, we aggregate the countries in the following regions: Northern Europe,
Southern Europe, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, America, Asia and a residual group.
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evasion by individuals and a country index of rule of law. We show that the predictions of
the theoretical model hold after taking into account a vector of controls and, furthermore,
that these are robust to specifications that allow for the possibility of autocorrelation of
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3.6.1 Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. We start by noting that the investigator’s equilibrium effort is given by the first
order condition for (1), which straightforwardly yields e∗ = 1− (1− λ)m.28 If h = 1, the
citizen’s problem is a solution to




e∗(λ,m)(1− θ) + (1− e∗(λ,m))
)







By plugging in the investigator’s equilibrium effort, let
Γ(b,m) :=λ(1− b)
(
(1− (1− λ)m)(1− θ) + (1− (1− (1− λ)m))
)






From the first-order conditions ∂Γ(b,m)/∂b = 0 and ∂Γ(b,m)/∂m = 0, we can recover
b∗(λ, θ) =
θλ (−1 + λθ(1− λ)2)
−1 + θ2λ2(1− λ)2
m∗(λ, θ) =
θ(1− λ)λ(θλ− 1)
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θ(1− θλ(1− λ)(2− λ(4 + θ) + 3θλ2)))
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θ + θλ(−2 + θ(−2 + λ(3 + θ(1− λ)2(1 + λ(−2 + θλ)))))
(−1 + θ2(1− λ)2λ2)2
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θ + θλ(−2 + θ(−2 + λ(3 + θ(1− λ)2(1 + λ(−2 + θλ)))))
(−1 + θ2(1− λ)2λ2)2
)
= −θ(1− θ) < 0
therefore, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there must exist some λ†(θ) ∈ (0, 1) such
that: if λ ≤ λ†(θ), then ∂m∗(λ, θ)/∂λ > 0; otherwise (λ > λ†(θ)), then ∂m∗(λ, θ)/∂λ < 0.
We conduct simulations to provide a graphical proof that ∂λ†(θ)/∂θ < 0:










Finally, we argued in the main body of the text that results hold if we were to assume
corr(λ, θ) > 0 instead of a flat penalty rate. To show this, suppose that the penalty rate is
now increasing along the quality of institutions as θ(λ) = θ̃(1 +λ). We choose this specific
functional as, we think, it is the simplest formulation to preserve tax evasion as a risky
practice; for instance, it ensures that θ(0) > 0. We need, however, to impose θ̃ ∈ (0, 1/2)
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θ̃λ(1− λ2)(−1 + θ̃λ(1 + λ))
−1 + θ̃2λ2(1− λ2)2
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= 2 θ̃(2 θ̃ − 1)
and since θ̃ < 1/2, then the latter equation must be negative. Using the Intermediate
Value Theorem, we have the same results as before when the penalty rate was flat.









λ(1− 2θ(1− λ)2λ+ θ2(1− λ)2)λ2
(−1 + θ2(1− λ)2λ2)2
)








λ(1− 2θ(1− λ)2λ+ θ2(1− λ)2)λ2
(−1 + θ2(1− λ)2λ2)2
)
=
λ(1− (2− λ)λ(1− λ)2)
(−1 + (1− λ)2λ2)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
where the second equality is negative if and only if 1 − (2 − λ)λ(1 − λ)2 < 0. But
since (a) lim
λ→0
(1− (2− λ)λ(1− λ)2) = 1; (b) lim
λ→1
(1− (2− λ)λ(1− λ)2) = 1; and (c)
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2) > 0, then it must be the case that
1 − (2 − λ)λ(1 − λ)2 > 0. Thus, ∂b∗(λ, θ)/∂θ > 0, from which follows that if θb > θa,
then b∗(λ, θb) > b∗(λ, θa). For the case of muscles, let ∆(θa, θb) := m∗(λ, θb)−m∗(λ, θa).








for the latter equality to be negative, it must be the case that 1− λ2(1− λ2) < 0, which




5) ≈ −0.618, which is a contradiction because λ > 0;




5) ≈ 1.618, which is a contradiction because λ < 1. This completes
the proof.
3.6.3 Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that if the citizen does not engage in evasion, then it is
optimal for him not to invest in brains or muscles. Let the difference in expected utility
between engaging (h = 1) and not engaging (h = 0) in evasion be defined as
∆̃(1, 0) : = Γ(b∗(λ, θ),m∗(λ, θ))− (1− τ)
=
−2 + θλ(2− θ(2− λ)λ2)
2(−1 + θ2(1− λ2)λ2)
− (1− τ)
Notice first that lim
λ→0






− θ + τ = 1
2
(




With respect to (4), notice that as θ → τ , then lim
λ→1
∆̃(1, 0) = θ2/2 > 0. Additionally,
note that we can rewrite (4) as 1
2
(
(θ − 1)2 + 2τ − 1
)
. This rewriting makes it easy to see
that if τ > 1/2, then lim
λ→1
∆̃(1, 0) > 0 because (θ − 1)2 + 2τ − 1 > 0. If this is the case,
then ∆̃(1, 0) > 0 for any parameter specification. However, if τ < 1/2, then for (4) to be
positive, we need (θ − 1)2 + 2τ − 1 > 0 which has two solutions: (a) θ > 1 +
√
1− 2τ or
(b) θ < 1 −
√
1− 2τ . Condition (a) cannot hold because it would imply having θ > 1,
which is unfeasible. On the other hand, condition (b) can hold for any τ ∈ (0, 1/2) as
it would satisfy having θ ∈ (0, 1). To summarize, we have that if θ < 1−
√
1− 2τ , then
lim
λ→1
∆̃(1, 0) > 0. Thus, the citizen would strictly prefer to engage in evasion. Intuitively,





∆̃(1, 0) < 0. And by the Intermediate Value Theorem, under the latter conjecture
then there must exist some λ‡(θ) ∈ (0, 1) such that: if λ < λ‡(θ), then ∆̃(1, 0) > 0 and
the citizen prefers to engage in evasion; otherwise (λ > λ‡(θ)), then ∆̃(1, 0) < 0 and the
citizen prefers not to engage in evasion. Finally, as before, we conduct simulations to
provide a graphic proof that ∂λ‡(θ)/∂θ < 0, fixing an arbitrary τ = 1/10:
Finally, as in the Proof of Lemma 1, we here allow corr(λ, θ) > 0 instead of a flat
penalty rate, with θ(λ) = θ̃(1 + λ). And, also, for corr(λ, τ) > 0, with τ(λ) = τ̃(1 + λ)/2
and τ̃ < 2θ̃, so that θ(λ) > τ(λ). It is easy to check that the following continues to hold:
lim
λ→0
∆̃(1, 0|τ(λ), θ(λ)) = τ̃ /2 > 0. Second, we now have
lim
λ→1
∆̃(1, 0|τ(λ), θ(λ)) = τ̃ − 2 θ̃ (1− θ̃) (4)
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from where we can recover the conditions for which τ̃ − 2 θ̃ (1 + θ̃) > 0 as follows.











where (5) straightforwardly holds whenever τ̃ > 1/2, which would require θ̃ > 1/4. When
















. Solution (i) is not feasible as θ̃ ∈ (1, 1/2), but condition (ii)











∆̃(1, 0|τ(λ), θ(λ)) > 0 and the citizen would strictly prefer to engage in evasion.










∆̃(1, 0|τ(λ), θ(λ)) < 0. Using the
Intermediate Value Theorem, we recover similar results as with a flat penalty rate.
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3.6.4 Proof of Remark 1.
Proof. Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that if τ > 1/2, then for any parameter
specification we have that ∆̃(1, 0) > 0 and the citizen prefers to engage in evasion. In
this case, λ†(θ) < λ‡(θ) since the latter would be strictly greater than one. However,
if τ < 1/2, then there exists some λ‡(θ) ∈ (0, 1) whenever the penalty rate is too high:
θ > 1−
√
1− 2τ . The sufficient conditions for λ†(θ) < λ‡(θ) would therefore imply having
θ ∈ (τ, 1−
√
1− 2τ) as any penalty rate in such range would guarantee ∆̃(1, 0) > 0.
We also noted in the main text that the range of values for which the prediction of an
inverted U-shape holds is, naturally, larger than those provided by the sufficient conditions.
The working example in the text was to set a tax rate τ = 0.13. The sufficient condition
implies that this shape of the estimates hold for any θ < 1 −
√
1− 2(0.13) ≈ 0.1397.
However, we here illustrate graphically the thresholds induced when we set θ = 0.31,
which are λ†(θ) ≈ 0.456 and λ‡(θ) ≈ 0.459.





Finally, allowing corr(λ, θ) > 0 and corr(λ, τ) > 0 instead of a flat penalty rate,









with τ̃ < 1/2.
3.6.5 Extension: Continuous evasion space.
In this section we allow for a continuous evasion space. The only difference from the
workhorse model is that the citizen chooses some h ∈ [0, 1]. everything else remains the
same. The citizen now needs to solve a triple optimization problem, which results in some
vector (h∗(λ, τ, θ), b∗(λ, τ, θ),m∗(λ, τ, θ)). To start, let




(1− (1− λ)m)(1− θ)h+ (1− (1− (1− λ)m))h
)
















: b = h2θλ(1−m(1− λ))
∂Γ̃(h, b,m)
∂m
: m = h2λθ(1− b)(1− λ)
Given our purpose of showing that results should continue to hold under a continuous
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evasion choice, we conduct simulations using the software Wolfram Mathematica. The code
is available both at request and at this public web link: https://www.dropbox.com/s/
158tijkxsuj7mxx/Simulations-Open%20Mathematica%20code.nb?dl=0. Before jump-
ing into that, notice that when the quality of institutions is degenerately low, the citizen


























































and, thereby, the entire limit at hand goes to infinity. Under some value of λ close to zero,
the optimization problem collapses to the analysis of Proposition 1. This is an important
point for the simulations, as there are inputted values for which no solutions are recovered
when the quality of institutions is low enough. In these cases, what operates are the
mechanisms of the main body of the text.
There are two insights that emerge from the above simulations. The first is intuitive:
the equilibrium amount of tax evasion is strictly decreasing along the quality of institutions.
The second, less obvious, are the subtleties across brains and muscles; in particular, the
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Note. The parameter values are τ = 0.2 and θ = 0.21. The generation of solutions included a range
from λ = 0.1 to λ = 0.95, with steps of 0.05. These are graphed by the points in both panels. Because
no solutions were found for λ < 0.55, it implied citizen’s incentives to set h = 1; and since we have
closed-form solutions for these optimal investments, these are the smooth lines in both panels.
right panel shows that (a) these strategies are complements at the extremes, but (b) these
can still be substitutes precisely at intermediate levels of the quality of institutions. What
remains is, indeed, putting together our theoretical quantity of interest. As illustrated
below, our theoretical expectations continue to hold.
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Note. The parameter values are the same as before. The output involves simply putting together the
inputs obtained from the vector of optimal investments in brains and muscles, as well as the size of the
evasion.
Finally, it is important to note that, through a simulation exercise, it is possible to
obtain that the range of values for which brains and muscles are substitutes holds only
if the penalty rates are not too high; if these are, then strategies are only complements.
This can be the case if, for instance, we choose arbitrarily move from the chosen θ = 0.21
to θ = 0.6. Nevertheless, this has no effect on the inverted U-shape of the estimates of tax
evasion, as the optimal investments in brains and muscle display still an inverted V-shape.
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The Empirics
The dataset and .do file are available both at request and at (i) the dataset: https:
//www.dropbox.com/s/ywmm46kzsrhadjw/Evasion%202021%20clean.dta?dl=0 and (ii)
the .do file: https://www.dropbox.com/s/qfaes3w1p84cp2b/Do%20polished.do?dl=0.
3.6.6 Additional Empirical Analyses
Figure 3.4: Tax Evasion variable for all countries in sample
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Figure 3.5: Rule of Law index variable for all countries in sample
Table 3.4: Additional Controls and Regional Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (Regions)
Rule of Law 5.89∗∗∗ 8.65∗∗∗ 7.44∗∗∗ 2.47∗∗∗
(1.97) (0.98) (2.24) (0.91)
Rule of Law2 -2.89∗∗∗ -3.46∗∗∗ -2.99∗∗ -1.43∗∗
(1.02) (0.68) (1.17) (0.56)
Press Freedom -0.11 -0.26
(0.08) (0.17)
Private Wealth 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.02)
Controls X X
Country Fixed Effects X X X
Region Fixed Effects X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X
Observations 409 235 197 555
R2 (within) 0.51 0.52 0.61 0.55
Standard errors clustered at the country level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: Main Regression with and without Fixed Effects
(FEs) (No FEs) (FEs) (No FEs)
Rule of Law 6.08∗∗∗ 5.72∗∗∗ 3.52∗∗ 2.63∗∗
(1.90) (1.82) (1.77) (1.26)
Rule of Law2 -3.00∗∗∗ -2.47∗∗ -2.01∗∗ -1.34∗∗
(0.96) (1.06) (0.83) (0.66)
Controls X X
Country Fixed Effects X X
Year Fixed Effects X X
Observations 555 555 555 555
R2 (within) 0.48 0.09 0.56 0.46
Standard errors clustered at the country level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.6: Regression results with deciles
(1)
Deciles Rule of Law 2. 0.02
Deciles Rule of Law 3. -0.03
Deciles Rule of Law 4. 0.01
Deciles Rule of Law 5. 0.12
Deciles Rule of Law 6. 0.22
Deciles Rule of Law 7. 0.00
Deciles Rule of Law 8. -0.17
Deciles Rule of Law 9. -0.18
Deciles Rule of Law 10. -0.20
Deciles Stability 2. 0.31∗
Deciles Stability 3. 0.27
Deciles Stability 4. 0.17
Deciles Stability 5. 0.21
Deciles Stability 6. 0.21
Deciles Stability 7. 0.18
Deciles Stability 8. 0.19
Deciles Stability 9. 0.24
Deciles Stability 10. 0.32
GDP -0.30
GDP2 0.05
Top Tax Rate -0.62
Inflation -0.16
Top 1% Income -1.28
Observations 433
Standard errors clustered at the country level are omitted from the table.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.7: Alternative Dependent and Main Independent Variables in 2016
(WB) (WB) (WJP) (WJP)
Rule of Law 3.53∗∗∗ 1.25 34.98∗∗∗ 16.08
(1.00) (1.57) (11.58) (10.17)
Rule of Law2 -1.44∗∗∗ -0.07 -37.25∗∗∗ -15.46
(0.55) (0.72) (12.18) (11.17)
Controls X X
Observations 162 123 99 81
R2 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.22
Note. WB stand for World Bank and WJP stand for World Justice Project.
Data comes form IMF estimates of the amount of individual tax evasion by country in 2016.
Robust standard errors. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.6.7 List of countries in the sample
1. Australia
2. Austria
3. Belgium
4. Brazil
5. Bulgaria
6. Canada
7. China
8. Croatia
9. Cyprus
10. Czech Republic
11. Denmark
12. Estonia
13. Finland
14. France
15. Germany
16. Greece
17. Hungary
18. India
19. Ireland
20. Italy
21. Japan
22. Latvia
23. Lithuania
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24. Luxembourg
25. Malta
26. Netherlands
27. Poland
28. Portugal
29. Romania
30. Russia
31. Slovakia
32. Slovenia
33. South Korea
34. Spain
35. Sweden
36. United Kingdom
37. United States
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